This report was written by Millard Burr, a retired U.S. government official and a consultant to the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). It is based on his experience as director of logistics operations for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Sudan from January 1989 to March 1990, and subsequent investigations.

The research, methodology, and conclusions contained in this report are those of Millard Burr, working independently of USCR. Although much of the research and methodology is beyond the scope of expertise of USCR, USCR believes the report is an important and credible contribution to understanding the crisis in Sudan and making policy to affect the situation there.


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FOREWORD BY USCR

Five years ago, the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) published a groundbreaking study by Millard Burr reviewing the death toll in Sudan's long civil war. That study, entitled *A Working Document: Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan 1983-1993*, estimated that 1.3 million people had died in southern Sudan due to war and war-related causes.

That staggering estimate, the product of painstaking research by Mr. Burr, indicated that the death toll in southern Sudan was nearly twice as large as previously realized. The conclusions of that first study have generally been accepted and used by policy makers, international media, humanitarian and human rights workers, and many Sudanese themselves.

This new report is an effort to update and expand that first study. Mr. Burr's meticulous research suggests that approximately 600,000 additional people have perished in southern and central Sudan since 1993, raising the toll to an astounding 1.9 million deaths since the current phase of Sudan's civil war began in 1983. This updated report expands the scope of research to include the Nuba Mountain area of central Sudan, for which virtually no information existed at the time of the first study.

This report, similar to the first one, is tedious reading. It is written in a dispassionately technical style. Few people will have the perseverance to read every word—we understand that. The value of this study is not in the writing, but in its extensive research, its careful documentation, and its intimate knowledge of Sudan and its war. This report, unfortunately, cannot convey the individual faces behind each terrible death, much as we would want it to. The study does, however, make an honest effort to measure the grotesquely unmeasurable extent of dying in a region that rarely receives attention commensurate with its suffering.

We invite feedback to this report. We call it a "working document" because all estimates cited here are open to revision as new or more precise information becomes available, if it ever does.

In the meantime, the dying in southern and central Sudan goes on and on, far surpassing the deaths in every other current or recent war in the world.

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AUTHOR’S PREFACE

The first Working Document published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in October 1993 (A Working Document: Quantifying Genocide In The Southern Sudan 1983-1993) reported that between May 1983 and May 1993 more than 1.3 million southern Sudanese had lost their lives as a direct result of civil war and the malevolent policies pursued by a succession of Khartoum governments.

Since publication of that first study, updated estimates by other sources have placed southern Sudan’s death toll even higher: "Intermittent civil war between the predominantly Christian and animist south and the Muslim-Arab north has plagued Sudan for decades [and taken] the lives of approximately 1,500,000 people in the past 15 years alone," a U.S. Senate committee report stated in February 1998. (1)

In this new Working Document II, published nearly five years after the first, and which includes specific data on the Nuba Mountains, research suggests that no fewer than 600,000 people have lost their lives since 1993. Thus, more than 1.9 million southern Sudanese and Nuba Mountains peoples have perished since the inception of the cataclysmic civil war that began in 1983.

From 1983 to the present, the civil war has juxtaposed a succession of Khartoum governments dominated by riverain Arabs against a rebel force dominated by ethnic Nilotes and African tribes from southern Sudan and South Kordofan. For more than 15 years, warfare, drought, famine, and attendant diseases—all accompanied by government indifference to human suffering—have caused widespread death and destruction.

Beginning in 1989, the relief activities undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan program have managed to limit the deaths of southern Sudanese affected by warfare, drought, and famine. However, despite the best efforts of Operation Lifeline Sudan and the many international agencies and organizations working in Sudan, the genocide in Sudan has continued.

Recently, however, it has been much harder to quantify accurately the number of deaths resulting from the effects of civil war and government neglect in the period 1994-1998 than it was for 1983-1993. Unlike the cataclysmic events that marked the period 1983-1993, the period 1994-1998 can be characterized as the "torture of a thousand cuts." Hundreds of thousands have died, but the deaths have usually occurred in small numbers, in a thousand villages, many of which are isolated. Untold numbers have perished along the innumerable trails used by internally displaced Sudanese to flee the effects of war or to search for food to assuage the pangs of hunger.

Unlike the period 1983-1993, during which foreigners and the media were able to observe a series of catastrophic events that caused the death of tens of thousands, in recent years, the Khartoum government has impeded the collection of field data. It has been relatively successful in sealing off much of Sudan from the prying eyes of journalists, aid agencies, and social scientists. Thus, the single most important cataclysmic event of recent date—the Nuba Mountains massacre—has transpired outside the field of vision of observers.

As will be seen, the Khartoum government also promoted three campaigns nearly as vicious as that carried out in the Nuba Hills of South Kordofan. The indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations, the effort to extirpate the Dinka of northern Bahr al-Ghazal, and government
efforts to pit ethnic groups against each other have affected nearly every citizen living in southern Sudan and the Transition Zone of South Kordofan. As noted above, in five years such acts have either directly or indirectly caused the deaths of at least 600,000 Sudanese.

As the author stated five years ago in the first report on this subject, so-called Working Document I, the effort to quantify with accuracy the exact dimension of the Sudan civil war is a Sysiphean task. Tragically, it does seem a task without end because the Khartoum government seems determined to pursue a civil war that has caused the utter devastation of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains.


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**Note Regarding the Geography of Sudan’s Administrative Units**

In January 1994, Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir announced that the number of states comprising the Sudan would be increased to 25. With only two exceptions, existing states would be divided by three. Thus, in Southern Sudan the former Equatoria was divided into Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria and Bahr al-Jabal. Upper Nile would become Upper Nile, Jonglei and al-Wahdah; Bahr al-Ghazal was divided into the states of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, and Lakes. The rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army rejected the decision.

To permit easy comparisons with the first Working Document issued by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, this study will continue the use of pre-1994 first-order administrative units—Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile. The map that appears on the following page reflects internal Sudanese boundaries as they existed in 1993.
GLOSSARY

GANTRY Government-supported militia in Bahr al-Ghazal
GOS Government of Sudan
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LRA Lord's Resistance Army, Ugandan rebel group supported by Sudan government
NDA National Democratic Alliance, political parties opposed to current government
NIF National Islamic Front, ruling hardline political coalition in Khartoum
NSRCC National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council
PDF People's Defense Forces, government-supported militias
SAF Sudan Armed Forces, government-supported army
SPAF Sudan People's Armed Forces, government-supported army
SPLM/A Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF South Sudan Defense Force
SSIM/A South Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent
INGO international non-governmental organization
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières
OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan
UN/DHA United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs (now OCHA)
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UN/OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN/WFP United Nations World Food Program
USAID/FEWS United States Agency for International Development/Famine Early Warning System
WHO World Health Organization

Murahileen Arab militias, usually on horseback, used by north to attack southerners
Mujahideen Persons encouraged to pursue a holy war, organized by the government of Sudan to attack the south

*tude* round huts
*payam* villages
*baggara* cattle-herding nomads
Dinka Southern Sudanese ethnic group
Nuer Southern Sudanese ethnic group
*ulema* Muslim scholars
I. SUMMARY OF FIRST TEN YEARS 1983-1993
(Adapted from Working Document I, published 1993)

Since May 1983, a civil war has raged in Sudan. For more than a decade, a succession of Sudanese governments, dominated by riverine Arab clans of the Nile Valley, have carried out unremitting warfare not only against the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), but against the civilian populations of southern Sudan as well.

The civilian population—African rather than Arab—has been attacked militarily and bombed indiscriminately; its major cities have been dominated and its inhabitants corralled by callous military commanders and their unprincipled Sudan People’s Armed Forces (SPAF). Khartoum governments continually have used food as a weapon of war, ensuring that SPAF troops garrisoned in the South would be fed even while the civilian population starved. Indeed, when the abid (slaves)—as southerners are called by much of the Arab populace—sought to escape war or famine by fleeing to the North, they have often been attacked en route by Arab civilians and militia.

Those killed directly in the violence number in the tens of thousands. Rapes and kidnappings are common; incidents involving the sale of young children by starving mothers (choosing the only way to ensure the survival of their progeny) number in the thousands. Rather than suffer such treatment, hundreds of thousands choose—and many die seeking—a safe haven in nearby countries.

During south Sudan’s first ten years of war 1983-1993, it also suffered a series of droughts, floods, and infestations, and it was only thanks to the United Nations, the Western food aid community, and international nongovernmental organizations that hundreds of thousands of southerners were saved from starvation and disease.

Year after year, successive governments have employed policies that spread terror and destruction throughout southern Sudan. For those who have studied this decade of despair, there can be little doubt that the various governments ruling in and from Khartoum have either been active participants or silent partners in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of African Sudanese.

Consequently, analysts have argued that the governments were guilty of genocide—as the term is defined by the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Indeed, the depredations have been so great and the incidents so many that there has been extensive speculation on the number of deaths involved. The range begins at an absurdly low figure of 259,000 deaths declared by Sudan’s governing Revolutionary Command Council in October 1989; in contrast, most writers until 1993 cited estimates of 500,000 to 600,000 deaths attributed to the war in the South.

Given this wide discrepancy, the author has attempted to quantify the disastrous consequences of what has been called Sudan’s Second Civil War. The author concluded in 1993 that more than 1.3 million southern Sudanese had lost their lives due to the civil war and its consequence—the malign policies approved by a succession of Khartoum governments.* To place the loss of 1.3+ million lives in context, Sudanese population experts generally agree that, despite the problems with the 1983 national census, at the time of the outbreak of civil war there were nearly five million southern Sudanese located in the South (comprising Upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr al-Ghazal regions). The Dinka ethnic group, largest of the myriad cultural entities that made up southern Sudan, accounted for about one-third of its population.

Regardless of whether the South held either one-fourth or slightly less than one-third of Sudan’s total population (as southern politicians claimed), the 1983 data remain important in light of later claims of genocide and estimates of deaths resulting from the second civil war.

Given the regional population growth rate of 3 percent in southern Sudan, and taking into consideration the present sketchy population estimates of 3.2 million southerners residing in the South and 1.8 million found in displaced camps in the north, the natural increase one could have expected in the South’s population in the period 1983-1993 has simply evaporated.

Thus, when the numerous atrocities carried out against the civilian population are added to the number of deaths by starvation and disease, it is the author’s opinion that in the first ten years of Sudan’s current civil war, the death of at least one in five southern Sudanese could be attributed to the civil war and government policies. Certainly, the war and the consequent population movements of large numbers of rural southern Sudanese have caused utter dislocation in—if not the ruination of—the South itself.

* The estimate of 1.3+ million deaths during 1983-1993 is hardly the last word on the subject, nor should it be. There are hundreds of Sudanese and expatriates who have worked in the southern Sudan who may wish to provide more detail to this study or challenge its assessment, including the thesis that a series of Khartoum governments have carried out a policy of genocide vis-a-vis the Africans of southern Sudan. Such efforts are welcome.
II. OVERVIEW OF 1994-1998

"Human folly causes famine..." Amartya Sen, a Harvard economist, argued that there has never been a serious famine in a country—even an impoverished one—with a democratic government and a free press. The press acts as a warning system and the pressures of democracy dissuade rulers from famine-producing policies.


Since the June 30, 1989 revolution, the Sudan civil war has been characterized by an incremental ferocity that has left untouched practically no one, and certainly no district, found in southern Sudan. Moreover, the government response to SPLA alliances with the ethnic Nuba of southern Kordofan, and the Beja and other ethnicities of the Red Sea region, has led the Khartoum government to carry out policies that spread death and destruction into northern Sudan itself. *While military casualties can be numbered in the tens of thousands, civilian losses during the Sudan's second civil war (1983-1998) now approach two million persons.*

The first USCR working document barely covered the conflict in the Nuba Mountain region. Since 1993, a number of eyewitness reports have underscored that the Khartoum government military activity and social policy directed against the Nuba peoples of South Kordofan have been nothing short of genocidal. Thus, this document reflects an attempt to obtain as much information as possible on the effect of government activity in the Nuba Mountain region since the June 30, 1989 revolutionaries took power in Khartoum. As will be seen, the data required a change in emphasis from "Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan," to "Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains." Eventually, this working document should include a study of the Beja and their allies in eastern Sudan and the Fur and Messalit of western Sudan. Like the Nuba, the Arab-dominated Khartoum government has applied a political and economic straightjacket, and authorized military attacks, on these "untrustworthy" ethnic minorities found on the Sudan's periphery.

For the preparation of this 1994-1998 working document, data have been spotty and difficult to obtain. Government attacks on civilian populations, and the concomitant effects of war such as famine and disease, have been episodic. And unlike the principal catastrophes of 1987-1988, the loss of civilian life has generally occurred here and there, usually in small numbers, and in thousands of settlements from the Nile River watershed from Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile to the southern frontier. Perhaps the most dreadful single episode was the famine that struck Bahr al-Ghazal in 1998. As this study is being completed, reports circulate that tens of thousands of southern Sudanese have died.

Throughout the period 1994-1998, there has been no government or international agency effort to compile casualty statistics in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan. Indeed, this updated working document has used reporting from many sources. The United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) material has been especially helpful. The OLS itself is a consortium of more
than forty United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations (INGO), which provides emergency relief for war-affected citizens of Sudan. The OLS effort was approved by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in March 1989, its humanitarian activities were coordinated by UNICEF, and its food aid and attendant logistics operations were managed by the UN/World Food Program (UN/WFP).

There are districts that have received only minimal coverage, but it must be emphasized that throughout the period 1994-1998, the Khartoum government made the movement of OLS administrators and INGO personnel as difficult as possible. Observers who could have been expected to report on local conditions were often excluded from regions where the Khartoum government purposely set one ethnic group against another (e.g., the Arab Murahileen raiders against the Dinka and the Nuer militias against the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal). Invariably, OLS participants were prohibited from taking part in activities where military scorched-earth campaigns were undertaken (southern Equatoria, Nuba Mountains). Still, enough material is available to allow an educated estimate of the impact the civil war has had during the period 1994-1998.
### III. QUANTIFYING THE DEAD

#### A. War Related Deaths of Southern Sudanese

_May 1983-May 1993_

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<tbody>
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<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>&gt;20,000</td>
<td>x10,000</td>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>x100,000</td>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>&gt;25,000</td>
<td>x100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr al-Ghazal</td>
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<td>&gt;50,000</td>
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<td>x100</td>
<td>x1,000</td>
<td>x100</td>
<td>x1,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>&gt;50,000</td>
<td>&gt;150,000</td>
<td>&gt;500,000</td>
<td>&gt;75,000</td>
<td>&gt;125,000</td>
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**GRAND TOTAL:** >1,300,000

Notes on tables: This table and others in the text employ the following symbols: >=Greater than; x100 = deaths in the hundreds; x 1,000 = deaths in the thousands, etc.; i/d = insufficient data. For example, x10,000 indicates that evidence points to the deaths of some multiple of ten thousand of people; perhaps 20,000, 30,000, 40,000, etc. The use of >20,000 indicates that at least 20,000 people died, but not as many as some multiple of 20,000. Throughout this and other tables, the author has consistently employed conservative estimates of the number of deaths. The regional and yearly subtotals take into account these conservative estimates, and represent what the author believes to be the minimum number of deaths within each region or each year.

(J.M. Burr, September 1993)
### B. WAR-RELATED DEATHS OF SOUTHERN SUDANESE

1994 - 1998

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<td>A. Bombing the Civilian Population:</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>B. Nuba Genocide:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Equatoria:</td>
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<td>x10,000</td>
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<td>Upper Nile:</td>
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<td>&gt;5,000</td>
<td>x10,000</td>
<td>&gt;100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Bahr al-Ghazal:</td>
<td>&gt;35,000</td>
<td>&gt;25,000</td>
<td>&gt;20,000</td>
<td>&gt;25,000</td>
<td>x50,000</td>
<td>&gt;200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 1994-1998:    |                     |                     |        |        |        | >600,000 |

TOTAL 1983-1993:    |                     |                     |        |        |        | >1,300,000 |

GRAND TOTAL 1983-1998:    |                     |                     |        |        |        | >1,900,000* |

* Because the outcome of the 1998 famine is still difficult to predict, and as more data on the Nuba genocide become available, it seems certain that war-related deaths for the period 1983-1998 will exceed two million Sudanese.

A. BOMBING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Estimated Deaths:  
Direct:  x1,000  
Indirect:  x10,000

Deaths resulting from Sudan Air Force attacks on civilian targets during the period 1994-1998 are almost impossible to quantify because the aerial sorties number in the thousands, the bombs dropped probably can be calculated in the tens of thousands, and the southern Sudanese villages attacked numbered in the hundreds. Villages allied with the SPLA or located in the path of government attacks became special targets; conventional bombs were dropped, as were rockets, vicious cluster bombs, and even anti-personnel land mines, whose deadliness survived well after the bombing event itself. (1) Delayed fuzes were used on occasion, and SPLA Commander John Garang reported (but was never able to prove conclusively) that at Yirol in June 1997 and on two other occasions, the Air Force dropped chemical weapons in Bahr al-Ghazal. (2)

The author's search for bombing data found that from 1994-1998, nearly 100 towns and villages in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains were bombed by Sudan Air Force planes. Though hardly exhaustive, a search by month uncovered nearly 300 different air strikes. The number of civilian deaths directly attributed to the Sudan Air Force air attacks is numbered in the several hundreds. Indirectly, however, the number of deaths that can be attributed to the bombing campaign is numbered in the tens of thousands. Essentially, air attacks were used as an instrument of terror and intended to drive villagers from their homes. Once villagers were displaced, tens of thousands of aged, sick, and malnourished perished as they moved from site to site to escape the conflict.

The widespread use of aircraft to attack civilian targets indicated that Khartoum had declared war not just on John Garang and his SPLA, but on its own people. It seemed the NSRCC was ready to commit any war crime in order to crush the southern rebellion. In certain cases it appeared that villages that harbored INGO aid agencies were a special bombing target, as were crucial infrastructure such as clinics and hospitals. Conversely, on numerous occasions the Khartoum government used the catch all excuse of "security" (i.e., bombing campaigns) to reject NGO requests to provide assistance to communities in dire need of food or medical assistance.

A-1 ∙ Bombings: NSRCC Initiates Air Attacks

The Khartoum government began to bomb civilian locations only months after taking power on June 30, 1989. The Sudan government used the Air Force in a campaign of indiscriminate aerial attacks on civilian populations in the Nuba Mountains and in Blue Nile province. On November 3, 1989 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that two unmarked planes, a jet fighter and a turboprop bomber, dropped some 25 bombs on Yirol,
Equatoria, killing four and wounding ten. It deeply affected OLS because the attack appeared to make no effort to differentiate between military and civilian targets, and several bombs exploded near the Red Cross hospital. When the International Committee of the Red Cross objected to the apparent targeting of a neutral site, the NSRCC used the protest to halt all OLS food aid flights in southern Sudan. It subjected the ICRC to a rigid "evaluation," and a once-friendly government-ICRC relationship ended.(3)

Air attacks increased literally within minutes of the unsuccessful conclusion in December 1989 of the Nairobi peace talks chaired by former United States President Jimmy Carter. Numerous villages along the Sobat River and in eastern Upper Nile were targeted. Invariably, the Antonov bombers operated at heights beyond the range of ground-to-air missiles that the military was convinced the SPLA had in abundance. The air raids had little or no military significance other than to terrorize the helpless civilian population. In January, information reached Khartoum that villages were being bombed in eastern Upper Nile near the border with Ethiopia. In Bahr al-Ghazal, the Sudan Air Force strafed Dinka villages; even more pernicious, cattle herds that brought both wealth and social status to the Dinka were strafed at Nyamlell, a prosperous Lol River town located 40 miles from the district capital at Aweil.

A-2 · Bombings: Air Force Expands Attacks

Through the first six months of 1990, air attacks were generally ineffective. Still, the NSRCC received substantial international criticism for bombing civilian populations. The NSRCC insisted that the military took great pains to differentiate between the SPLA and the mass of southern Sudanese, but any pretense that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF or Sudan army) sought to differentiate between southern Sudanese civilians and the SPLA was abandoned once the NSRCC rejected in June 1990 a peace plan surfaced by the U.S. State Department. Literally within hours of that event, two government planes bombed Torit, a district town used by SPLA leader John Garang as his headquarters, killing 20 civilians, most in a crowded marketplace. In Upper Nile, villages along the Sudan-Ethiopia border were attacked, and witnesses arriving in Khartoum and OLS administrators reported significant air attacks on Bor, Yirol, Akon, and Waat by TU-22 bombers; the attacks caused hundreds of casualties. Meanwhile, the Sudan army was re-armed, receiving MiG-23s from Libya and other aircraft from Iraq and China.(4)

After scores of villages were struck, the SPLA argued—and the Khartoum government-controlled media generally agreed—that the bombing campaign was undertaken "to stop the ongoing relief effort" in SPLA-held territory.(5) Certainly, the UN/OLS office was aware that the attacks ended any pretense that the NSRCC would permit the unhampered distribution of food aid to civilians in the SPLA territory as called for under the OLS agreement signed in March 1989. In the autumn of 1990, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar asked President Bashir to explain why civilian targets were being bombed. He also protested an air attack on the Red Cross II, a humanitarian food aid barge moored at Bor. The raids had killed numerous civilians and endangered UN personnel and aircraft.(6)

While the Khartoum government brushed aside UN protests, Sudan army raids hit Bor and nearby villages between September 20-24, 1990 killing numerous women and children and forcing a halt to UN food shipments to Upper Nile region. The U.S. State Department issued a statement condemning the wave of bombing attacks. It noted: "Our Ambassador in Sudan has raised the issue of these bombings with Sudan's President al-Bashir, but has received no assurances they will stop."(7) On the Nile's west bank, Leer was bombed on September 22 and 25, 1990, and at least a score of civilians were killed in air attacks on Yirol, Waat, Akon, Bor, and Ayod.(8)
Within days, Sudan army high-altitude bombing continued with vigor: Waat was bombed, as were Torit and Kongor; in November 1990, raids on civilian targets were reported at Aluakluak and Akot in Bahr al-Ghazal, and Nyamlell was bombed and nearby villages and cattle herds were strafed.

The Equatoria region was also very hard hit, and a single raid on Torit caused a dozen civilian deaths. Following that raid, Bishop Paride Taban asked a question that troubled many minds: "Where there is no conventional war, why should the government bomb?"(9) In December 1990, villages in western Equatoria received their baptism of fire; scores were attacked in the wake of an SPLA campaign that pushed government troops from Tambura, Maridi, Yambio, and Nzara.

The sporadic bombing that continued through early 1991 increased exponentially after the Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Miriam began its collapse. In May 1991, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese fled the safety of Ethiopian refugee camps and flooded into Sudan's Upper Nile region. Near Nasir, the Sudan Air Force bombed concentrations of displaced persons, thousands of whom were already starving and near death. Sudan Air Force planes bombed refugee concentrations near Nasir, "claiming they were part of the SPLA." The attacks killed scores and damaged a local hospital.(10)

A-3 • Bombings: International Protests

Through 1992, the Sudan army increased its air attacks and thus generated thousands of internally displaced people. During a visit to southern Sudan, U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf verified reports of high altitude bomb attacks on civilian targets, especially on Kajo Kaji. Indeed, the NSRCC had warned the INGO community that it would soon bomb both Nimule and Polotaka, where the displaced had congregated. NGOs were often forced to evacuate sites even while thousands of Sudanese were at risk from disease and malnutrition. In certain cases, it appeared that villages where international (invariably Western) aid agencies worked were a specific target, as were their schools, clinics, and hospitals. On nearly 40 occasions, humanitarian relief was suspended and workers were evacuated from locations where malnutrition, gastroenteritis, measles, kala-azar, meningitis, and other dangerous diseases had caused loss of life.

The government used helicopter gunships to attack villages, and there were reports that diabolical cluster bombs were being dropped on civilian targets.(11) Even the normally circumspect UN-OLS information officer condemned the NSRCC for its relentless and indiscriminate policy of bombing civilian population centers with "old Soviet-made cargo planes flying at 12,000 feet or higher over rebel-held areas," that dropped "500-pound bombs out of the back cargo hatch."(12)

In early 1993, the re-armed Sudan army was everywhere on the attack in the South. As the army moved southward from Malakal and linked-up with its forces in Juba city, tens of thousands of Equatorians once under SPLA control in Kapoeta and Torit fled toward Sudan's frontiers. From Juba southward, SPLA towns and villages were bombed. In August 1993, the Sudan army initiated the protracted bombing of civilian population centers in western Equatoria. Sudan army ground forces received air support, and villages between Yei and Morobo were bombed, causing heavy civilian casualties and causing "about 100,000 people" to flee Kaya and its vicinity.(13) Fearing they were a bombing target, civilians massed at Koboko and, camping in the open, fled toward "northern Uganda, Zaire, and other areas inside Sudan."(14) The Sudan Council of Churches later reported that along the way, the 60,000 displaced fleeing Koboko for Uganda suffered continuous strafing and bombing attacks by government MiG 23s and Antanov bombers.(15)
Despite numerous international appeals to halt the indiscriminate bombing, the Khartoum government denied it had ordered such air attacks. Nonetheless, "two British MPs returning from the area on August 18 were in no doubt about the bomb casualties they had seen."(16) At the UN, the General Assembly expressed "its concern over the reported attack on November 12, 1993 by aeroplanes of the government of the Sudan on an airstrip in Thiet that resulted in injuries to three relief workers, and further concerned by the reported bombing of civilian areas in Loa and Pageri on November 23, 1993 that may have resulted in deaths or injuries." (17)

In a November 1993 response to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Khartoum government complained bitterly that an interim report submitted by Special Rapporteur Gaspar Biro was factually incorrect. Specifically, Biro had written: "Many reports have been received concerning indiscriminate and deliberate aerial bombardments by government forces on civilian targets, e.g. camps for displaced persons." The government of Sudan responded: "Deliberate, yes, but they are not indiscriminate. The aerial bombardments took place, but against military targets where heavy weaponry is used by the rebels against the civilian population." It then added: "For the record, we would like to state that there are no displaced camps in the SPLA-controlled areas. All displaced camps are situated in the northern part of the Sudan [sic] for those fleeing the combat zones."

In early 1994, one INGO reported "numerous aerial bombardments of civilian targets" as it sought to provide relief food to the displaced in the Kajo Kaji and Kaya regions of Equatoria.(18) Another report added a touch of irony: "The Government's aerial bombing campaign has had some military value in that it has forced tens of thousands of people into flight."(19) By then, air attacks were so commonplace that attack dates, locations, and casualties were seldom remarked upon. For example, an eye surgeon who worked under particularly difficult circumstances in Equatoria noted laconically that government planes would "regularly bomb the villages and one must constantly be ready to rush for the shelters."(20)

In June 1994, 23 celebrated Sudanese—representatives of opposition political, social and religious organizations—met at Bonn, Germany and condemned "the NIF [National Islamic Front] Regime" for "committing the most flagrant violations of human rights in the history of Sudan." Of particular concern was "the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, including refugee camps," which had resulted in the "uprooting of populations" and the "mass exodus of hundreds of thousands."(21)

And still the bombings continued. A horrible attack on Yambio in November 1995 left numerous dead and wounded and caused one news service to label the air attacks "part of a general campaign by Khartoum to terrorize people."(22) A few months later, a report submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights noted 37 incidents of aerial bombing "in areas inhabited by civilian populations."(23) In June 1966, bombers dropped cluster bombs on Chukudum, a town of some 6,000 residents, which had already been the target of 17 government bombings "since 23 September 1992." With the constant attacks, fields could not be cultivated, schools and health clinics ceased operating, and two thirds of the population had fled and were barely surviving in the Didinga Hills.(24)

An investigation team would report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that: "Villagers with whom we talked described NIF sporadic air assaults using Antonov cargo aircraft modified to carry 500-pound iron bombs." And targets seemed to be chosen indiscriminately by government pilots, "many of whom simply attacked the largest civilian populations possible rather than search for military targets."(25)
By 1996, it was evident that the Sudan Air Force was dropping "cluster bombs" on villages in the SPLA-controlled areas. The cluster bombs sprayed delayed-action bomblets and anti-personnel minelets in and around villages. They killed and maimed humans and severely aggravated civilian suffering long after the raid itself. They also destroyed cattle and halted cultivation. In fact, the impact on the food supply was likely the most pernicious element of the whole bombing campaign: One observer noted that the bombing of Bahr al-Ghazal "not only disrupted farming by forcing thousands to leave their homes at a time when they would normally be clearing land in advance of the April rains, but it has demoralized many farmers who have struggled for years to eke out a living."(26)

A-4 • Bombings: Conclusion Regarding Bombings

From 1994 through 1998, the Sudan Air Force carried out thousands of air attacks on southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. In Bahr al-Ghazal, bombing campaigns provided cover for Army forces, Arab militias (Murahileen), PDF, and southern rebels who had joined with Khartoum to destroy the ethnic Dinka.

In Equatoria, air attacks often combined with artillery bombardments caused the depopulation of hundreds of villages. The internally displaced people were hounded as they fled the fighting and were bombed as they sought safety in Uganda and Kenya. Despite the presence of United Nations/Operation Lifeline Sudan and INGO operations, government planes even targeted displaced persons camps.

In a cruel attack meant to destroy their spirit, in 1997, the Sudan Air Force bombed refugees and the displaced as they returned home from displaced camps in the Sudan-Kenya and Sudan-Uganda borderlands.

Despite cease-fires and talk of peace, the bombing campaigns would continue. In late 1998, as the SPLA threatened to attack Torit, an "extensive" bombing campaign was carried out in eastern Equatoria. Some sixteen civilian targets were hit in late August and early September.(27) And as the rebels moved closer to Juba, there were reports of indiscriminate bombing in that region.
# Table

## Location of Bombing Attacks Reported on Civilian Populations 1994-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>* = Bombed more than once.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr al-Ghazal</td>
<td>Achono 02/1998. Achumchum 02/98. Adet 02*-03*/98 and frequent cluster bomb raids on various sites near Rumbek, Wau and Aweil. Akon 12*/94; 04*/95. Akot 05*/97, 02/98. Gogrial 02/98. Liethnom 01/95. Luanyakar 02/98. Malual Kon 02/98. Mayen Abun 04/94, 01/95. Nyamlell 04/95,01/97, 02/97, 06/97. Pakor 02/98. Paluer 05/98. Panacier 04*/95, 06, 07/98. Panlial 11/95. Panthou 12/96, 03/97, 05/97. Thiet 03*/97, 04/97, 05*/97, 03/98. Tonj 05*/97, 02*/98. Wau District 02/98. Warrap, 03*/95.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A-5 • Footnotes to Section IV, Part A, "Bombing the Civilian Population"


(4) "The Junta Shows Its True Face," The Middle East, March 1990.


(6) U.S. Embassy, Khartoum, Cable 10122, September 26, 1990.


(22) "Sudanese rebel offensive gains ground in South," Reuters, Nairobi, November 6, 1995.


B. THE NUBA GENOCIDE

Estimated Deaths: \( \times 100,000 \) (multiples of 100,000)

The Nuba Mountain region of South Kordofan comprises 30,000 square miles, or an area slightly larger than the Netherlands and Belgium combined. The region, which is shaped in the form of an irregular pentagon with its short side to the northwest and long side to the south, is home to 52 different ethnic groups. Prior to the onset of a military campaign initiated by the Khartoum government in 1990, the Nuba congregated in 50 to 60 villages of 5,000-10,000 people. A few were towns, per se, but most were actually linear settlements where people lived in round huts (tude) spread over a long distance. Despite the fact that some villages (payam) are overwhelmingly Islamic or Christian, and some communities practice traditional religions, the Nuba have a long tradition of religious tolerance. There is still found a shared cultural affinity based on geographical proximity and similar "conditions of life." A multiplicity of languages and dialects have been clustered into ten distinct linguistic groups, each sharing a generally distinct geographic region.(1) Traditionally, communications were maintained by officials who often walked days or even weeks to reach their destination.

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**TABLE: LANGUAGES IN NUBA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Classification</th>
<th>Kordofan Location</th>
<th>Geographic Descriptors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kadugli-Korongo</td>
<td>Center-South</td>
<td>Kadugli, Keiga, Miri, Kacha, Tulishi, and Korongo Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Daju</td>
<td>West and Southwest</td>
<td>Lagowa town; Shatt Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Talodi-Mesakin</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Talodi; Lumum; Mesakin Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lafofa</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Eliri Range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Koalib-Moro</td>
<td>Center-East</td>
<td>Kauda; south from Delami; west of Heiban, Moro and Lumun Hills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tegali-Tagoi</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>Tegali Range from Kadaka through Rashad to Turum and west to the Tagoi Range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nyimang</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Nyimang Hills west of Dilling; Mandal Hills north of Nyimang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Temein</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Temein Hills south of Nyimang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Hill Nuban</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>From Dair through Kaduru; Dilling; the Ghulfan Ranges; Wali to hills in W. Kordofan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Nuba tribes inhabited the Sudan long before the arrival of Arab tribes. However, centuries of attacks by their Arab neighbors forced the various Nuba peoples to find sanctuary in what are now called the Nuba Mountains. Until very recently, the region was isolated and certainly far removed economically from the Sudanese heartland. Prior to the Sudan’s independence, a colonial governor of Kordofan reported in 1931 that the Nyimang and Koalib were the only authentic Nuba because they were not Arabized nor "Arab-dominated".(2) Ironically, following the creation of the Republic of Sudan, the Nuba—whether Arabized or unacculturated—were marginalized by a succession of Arab-dominated governments in Khartoum.

It was not until the 1970s that the region was understood to have "great economic potential." A mechanized farming system was introduced in the rain-fed agricultural region east of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, and there began the slow encroachment on Nuba land. Simultaneously, to the west of Kadugli, the Arab cattle nomads (baggara) who had long coveted the Nuba pasturelands began their own encroachment. The result was to draw the various Nuba tribes into a loose political alliance that has strengthened over time.

B-1 • Nuba: Population Data

In the 1955-56 census, the first and undoubtedly the most detailed demographic study undertaken in the Republic of Sudan, some 575,000 Nuba—comprising slightly more than 60 percent of the population of South Kordofan—were enumerated.

In the third census of Sudan, taken in 1983, the population of South Kordofan totalled 1.287 million people; two-thirds of that total (850,000) were classified as "rural settled," and of that total, the vast majority were Nuba. Nearly one-quarter of South Kordofan’s population (320,000) was "rural nomadic," comprised almost exclusively of Baggara tribes.(3) Undoubtedly, the largest congregation of Nuba were found in Kadugli District, where 330,000 people were enumerated.(4)

Given an estimated annual population growth rate of 2.8 percent, by 1989 there were probably close to a million Nuba in South Kordofan. However, no one could say for sure because the 1983 census was in many cases a hit-and-miss affair, especially in the Nuba Mountains.(5) An expert who has written numerous articles and books on the Nuba Mountains estimated that in 1989, there were some 1.3 million Nuba located in South Kordofan. (6) The figure may have been generous, but given the lack of data it is impossible to dispute. Certainly, claims by ethnic Nuba that the tribes comprise about 2 million people seems unjustifiably high.(7)

B-2 • Nuba: Military Activity

During the period 1983-1988, the Nuba generally sought to refrain from choosing sides in a civil war that pitted the North against the South. Nevertheless, given government neglect, militia raiding, and the myriad and not so subtle forms of racism to which they were subjected, by 1989 many Nuba were allied with the SPLA, and some had even joined its military. The Nuba themselves trace their distrust to 1985, when they felt the government instituted policies to marginalize or eliminate educated Nuba leadership from participation in the Sudanese polity. By January 1989, the SPLA New Cush Brigade, comprising Nuba rebels and led by former schoolteacher Yusif Kuwa Mekki, made its appearance in the Nuba Mountains.
3/1987: **Saburi, Um Dulu** — The first major massacre is reported at Suburi village, located just east of Kadugli. Nearly 100 are killed. It is followed by government attacks on Moro Nuba at Um Dulu village near Acheron, and at Lupa in the Moro Hills.

1-4/1989: **Angolo, Tira Lumun** — The SPLA presence leads to a government attack on Angolo villages (Kadugli-Karongo Nuba) in the Miri Hills. Other attacks were initiated in the eastern Jebels on Koalib-Moro villages in the Lumun hills east of the Moro Range.

**B.3 • Nuba: NSRCC Goes On Attack**

Shortly, after seizing power on June 30, 1989, the military junta announced a unilateral cease-fire in southern Sudan. The rebel SPLA, which had previously accepted a UN-sponsored cease-fire in support of OLS, refused to participate. The SPLA had just won a series of victories that swept the government from all but a few major garrison towns in southern Sudan. While the government cease-fire did not specifically include the Nuba Mountains, ground warfare was reduced even though the Sudan government had been under strong attack by Nuba leader and SPLA Commander Yusif Kuwa. Skirmishing continued and involved small units until September 1989, when Nuba villagers arriving in Kadugli reported that for the first time the Sudan government forces were supported by armed helicopters that fired at anything that moved.

The tenuous peace in the Nuba Mountains ended for good in October 1989, after SPLA and Sudan armed forces collided in Blue Nile region near the Ethiopia-Sudan frontier. Literally within hours, a Sudan armed forces column went on the attack in the Nuba Mountains. The SPLA-Sudan army battle was truly engaged, and the NSRCC began to pursue with great vigor a military conclusion to the civil war. From 1989 through 1991 alone, "scores of villages were burned and thousands of villagers killed in joint army and militia assaults" in the Nuba Mountains. The Sudan army purged Nuba officers and noncommissioned officers, and thousands of educated Nuba were arrested (200 in Kadugli). Hundreds of Nuba leaders simply "disappeared."

To eliminate the SPLA presence in the Nuba Mountains, the Sudan army initiated a series of penetrations designed to destroy villages and force occupants to flee. In 1990 alone, scores of villages were torched and thousands were killed in government "scorched earth" raids carried out by soldiers quartered at the Kadugli and Talodi garrisons. While the attacks were military in nature, the underlying rationale seemed economic in nature: as Nuba abandoned their land, it was claimed by government satraps who sought to introduce large-scale mechanized agriculture. In the east and north, the Sudan government forces supported locally organized Peoples Defense Forces (PDF), Missiriya Arab militias (Murahileen) and, eventually, the Khartoum government's own Mujahideen (Holy Warriors).

By 1991, the government had blocked nearly all trade in and out of the Nuba Mountains, and when the Sudan army and its support elements attacked villages, the indigenous economy was targeted and Nuba shops and markets were destroyed. Food stores were carried off or destroyed. Such attacks on cultivators, and the destruction of crop stores and crops in the field, would...
eventually cause thousands of Nuba to flee the lowlands for the hills. The result would be widespread famine. The Sudan government's slash and burn campaign led many Nuba to join the SPLA. In turn, the government arrested more Nuba leaders. Hundreds were jailed in El Obeid and were never heard of again.

In 1991, a widespread drought and regional insecurity caused thousands of famine stricken families to move to displaced camps that had been formed around government-controlled towns.

1-12/1990: Dar, Tabidi, Bilenya, Daloka — Hundreds of villages are leveled and untold numbers killed.
3/1990: Kadugli, Rashad, Dilling, Al-Foula — Nearly 150,000 are displaced by Sudan army attacks. Kadugli reports 115,000 displaced from rural Kadugli, Rashad counts 32,000 from eastern rural areas, Dilling reports 40,000 from rural Habilla, Salara and northern Kadugli, and 2,500 arrive at Al-Foula from the Lagowa and Keilak regions.(9)
7-12/90: Daju villages — Numerous attacks near Lagowa and Nimr Shago. Kayo and Balol villages destroyed. Jabal Tabak, north of Lagowa, is attacked late in the year.
6-12/90: Kuchama, Otoro — Due east of Kadugli, Sudan government attacks displace tens of thousands of Koalib-Moro villagers.
9/90-06/91: Tira — South of Heiban the Murahileen burn nearly a dozen Koalib-Moro villages in the Tira al-Akhdar. Hundreds are killed, many flee to Dulu and Buram. The 1990 harvest is burned, and farmers will be unable to cultivate in 1991.
4/90-6/1991: Shawaya — Villages attacked by Army units and Murahileen militia west of Heiban. Many were killed: "The militia were in the business of capturing people; the army just killed them."(10)
9/1991: Saburi — A Loya village just east of Kadugli reports 250 killed and all houses burned in a Murahileen attack.(11)
10/1991: Lagowa — The Nuba Mountains are "sealed off" by the Sudan military. As hundreds of Nuba are detained in Lagowa or El Obeid it is observed that "the Genocide was to be perpetrated in silence."(12)
11/1991: Lubi — The Sudan government forces quartered at Abu Jibeha attack many villages to the southwest. Widespread damage is reported.
11-12/1991: Miri Hills — The largest concentration of government forces ever reported for a single attack. SPLA positions in the western Jabals and Miri Hills located west and southwest of Kadugli are hit. Scores of villages are leveled and many deaths are reported.
B-4 • Nuba: Jihad Begins

In January 1992, South Kordofan governor, Lt. General al-Hussein, formally declared a Holy War (Jihad) in the Nuba Mountains(13). By approving of or acquiescing in wholesale murder, abduction, rape, family separation, forced religious conversion, and the forced relocation of tens of thousands of Nuba in so-called "peace villages," the Khartoum government sought to extirpate the Nuba peoples themselves. There followed more attacks on villages, and a policy of military conquest was attended by a "policy of famine." By approving the slaughter of villagers, and by initiating policies that would lead ineluctably to the deracination and acculturation of the Nuba peoples, the NIF government is committed to cultural genocide.

In June 1992, the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum reported that Governor al-Hussein had "announced plans to relocate some 25,000 displaced from the Nuba Mountains" to the "three provinces in Northern Kordofan": the result would be the "detribalization and scattering of the Nuba people"; the relocations themselves were "construed as no less than an overt military strategy to depopulate the Nuba Mountains."(14) Despite the protests of INGOs and Western embassies, 17,000 Nubans were removed from well-run camps for internally displaced persons at Kadugli and dumped on unsuspecting city commissioners in En Nahud, Bara, and El Obeid. None of them "either requested or wanted the relocated displaced." And of the homeless and "traumatized" who had been taken from Kadugli, the "majority [were] sick and malnourished."(15) The embassy reported "fear among the donors that the relocated displaced would be forced into indentured labor on agricultural schemes or in households." In all North Kordofan relocation sites, where no INGOs were allowed to operate, there were 43 deaths reported in Um Ruwaba and 44 in En Nahud in the first month after the arrival of the Nuba displaced.

Given the Sudan army bombing and strafing campaigns and the numerous reports of human rights violations, including the purposeful attacks on civilian populations, the U.S. Congress enacted in October 1992 its Resolution 140, "Relating to the humanitarian relief and human rights situation in Sudan": The Resolution ordered the American representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights to support the appointment of a special rapporteur to investigate conditions in Sudan. The Commission on Human Rights responded by naming Gaspar Biro to the post of Special Rapporteur on Sudan.

2/1992: Wali, Tima, Katla, Jalud, Nyima — Simultaneous attacks on villages west of Dilling. Many are killed, thousands are displaced.

2/1992: Ningele — Many Moro people were burned to death in their church or killed as they sought to flee a militia attack.


2-05/1992: Tullishi — The Jihad campaign is opened north of Lagowa; Government forces (Sudan army, PDF, Murahileen, Mujahideen) totalling some 50,000 actives attack SPLA positions around Jebel Tullishi. Army uses helicopter gunships, MiG23, and Antonov bombers. Many civilians are killed and thousands of displaced generated. Village wells are poisoned. The force is withdrawn in May, just before the onset of the rainy season. Later reports indicate 1,842 recorded deaths by starvation.(17)

2-12/1992: Tira — Reports of widespread starvation south of Heiban. It is certain that the fatalities—most of whom were children—can be numbered in the tens of thousands."(18)
2-12/1992: Maryam, Tima Hills — The region south of Dilling is pillaged by Misseriya Murahileen; "not a single village escaped."(19) "Hundreds" of dead are reported in Kuwe village alone. Consequently, there is practically no farming in 1992.

3/1992: Jebel Abu Januq — Village north of Lagowa is given 72 hours to evacuate before it is destroyed.

3/1992: Kadugli — When efforts to take the OLS program to rural Nuba villages are rejected by Khartoum, "40,000 civilians descended on Kadugli alone in the space of five days."(20)


3-12/1992: Delami — West of Rashad, numerous deaths are reported among Koalib people; some 10,000 Nuba were forced to relocate.


6/1992: Kadugli — 100-300 displaced arrive daily. Child malnutrition rates were "in the range of 59.5 percent." Official estimates indicated that 80,000 civilians "fleeing atrocities and famine" had already arrived at Kadugli and Dilling. Most were totally destitute women, children and the elderly. At Kadugli, "more than 180 deaths" were reported in the first three weeks of June despite the intervention of numerous INGOs.(21)


1-12/1992: Ghulfan Range — Perhaps the most complete destruction in the 1991-92 campaign occurred in Hill Nuba villages in the northwest and the north-central sector, where it was reported "all the villages were destroyed."(22)

9/1992: Various — During a visit, U.N. Ambassador Jan Eliasson is told of massacres by Sudan forces and PDF in "Lagori, Lagowa, Kamada, Tulushi, Kadugli town, and many more." Helicopter gunships and artillery used at Lagowa, Kamada, and Tulshi. A dozen large villages around Dilling were devastated.(23)

12/1992: Various — 31 killed near Abri and Dellami. Koalib tribes (predominantly Catholic) are targeted. South of Dilling, 22 killed at Tulushi village. Near Lagowa, 20 killed at Ladi and Riwabba villages. "Many civilians" were killed during an army attack on Sadah, near Dilling; the village church, school, and mosque were burned. Near Tubira 100 killed; homes were set afire and people shot as they fled. (24)

12/1992: Jebel Heiban — Reports circulate of a December massacre, "where hundreds, perhaps thousands, of villagers were killed and dumped in mass graves." Another report speaks of 13 mass graves in which "there were about 20,000 villagers, men, women and children killed."(25) Amnesty International receives unconfirmed reports of "several hundred civilians" killed in the Kualit area near Heiban.(26)

12/1992-1/1993: Kuarten — Villagers report to Christian missionaries that attackers "killed so many people we ran away."
B-5 - Nuba: "Peace Villages" Force Resettlement

Following the creation of a South Kordofan Peace and Resettlement Administration in April 1991, the government undertook a plan to use "peace villages" in which internally displaced people could be congregated. By February 1992, the government had created 22 peace villages to house 70,000 returnees, and the government discussed openly the resettlement of 500,000 Nuba internally displaced people. The first to be concentrated were an estimated 50,000 internally displaced people who had congregated at Kadugli, Dilling, Talodi, and Lagowa following a series of Sudan government offensives carried-out in early 1992. Incredibly, tens of thousands were moved from the Nuba Hills, and "between June and August at least 30,000 Nuba" were trucked to peace villages in Northern Kordofan."(27) Hundreds of unaccompanied Nuba children were shipped to Sheikan, a camp located near El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan province.

In North Kordofan, the camps at Um Ruwaba, En Nahud, Sheikan, Sidra and Hamrat al-Shaykh began as little more than death traps. In July, as many as 15 people a day perished at the concentration camp at Um Ruwaba. USAID-Sudan reported many deaths and terribly high malnutrition rates in children under five.(28) Other camps that soon housed more than 30,000 displaced were created in the Nuba Mountains at Angarko near Dilling, Rashad, and at six camps surrounding Kadugli. The SPLA reported that in late 1993 the government had taken children from parents and "ten thousand were sent to Libya from Sheikan concentration camp."(29) The report was denied by the governments of Sudan and Libya.

The numbers of Nuba displaced people would increased substantially in the following months, as a man-made famine lasted through 1993 and affected all Nuba Mountain peoples. As more and more peace villages were occupied, reports reached Khartoum and the outside world that the encampments really served as prisons where the displaced were kept "against their will."(30) Because government health and food provisions were minimal, thousands would die in and be buried near the camps. Within a year, the government claimed it had created 91 peace villages comprising some 170,000 people. In general, the able-bodied were used as labor in the towns and in the fields. In many cases, children were separated from mothers, and whether families approved or not, children were educated in Islamic schools.

The relocation of tens of thousands of Nuba and the attendant human rights violations led the U.N. Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs to address the issue in September 1992. From that date, the Nuba issue was internationalized, but the Khartoum government would not accede to the request of Gaspar Biro (the UN rapporteur) to undertake a personal on-site investigation of conditions in the Nuba Mountains. In May 1993, the first film reportage on the Nuba Mountains appeared in the West. In the United Kingdom, a television program helped verify reports that "between late 1991 and 1993" the Nuba Mountains had suffered "the most severe famine in Sudan."(31) The drought had an indescribable effect on Nuba society, as the usual coping mechanisms employed to outlast a drought and preclude famine had been destroyed by the military. The region is everywhere in flux.

12/1992-1/1993: **Heiban** — Sudan government forces attack leads to charges of a major massacre, with reports as high as 6,000 civilians killed. Charges could not authenticated, but it is known that many deaths occur as a result of artillery barrages fired on villages in the Otoro and Tira el Akhdar region. Also, hundreds of villagers were abducted and never seen again.

1/1993: **Kawalib** — Region north of Heiban is attacked by Sudan forces from Dilling. Some deaths are reported.
1/1993: **Karkari al-Beira** — Village located 30 miles east of Kadugli is attacked by PDF and Murahileen in late 1992 and early 1993. "Scores of people were killed and 400 homes and the church were destroyed."(32)

2/1993: **Lake Abyad, Turoji** — Sudan government attacks from Muglad garrison in region south of Buram where "tens of thousands of famine refugees" had congregated.(33) A "major massacre," considered the largest single atrocity to date, follows. Some 1,900 were either killed or died of hunger and thirst while trying to escape.

2/1993: **Tima** — Northwest region again attacked by Sudan government forces. Koya, Balol, Maryam and Koya villages were burned. Scattered deaths.

7/1993: **Shatt Tibeldi** — Shatt villages south of Kadugli are attacked by Sudan government forces; villages near Shatt Damam are destroyed.

8/1993: **Southern Nuba Mountains** — At a meeting of a relief agency, UN participants and Nuba held at Pariang District, Upper Nile, a Nuba spokesman reported that "50,000 people were displaced and starving." They added that the Nuba had "no medicines of any kind," and much of the population was "without clothes."(34) Nuba leaders declared that in the region "above 16,000 people died of hunger and thirst since 1989." It was asserted that the government policy of "ethnic cleansing [was] geared towards replacing the Nuba people with the Arab tribes of Kordofan."(35)

9/1993: **Om Dorein** — Government captures town west southwest of Kadugli, some killed and 5,000 flee to surrounding hills and are soon noted in desperate condition.

11-12/1993: **Buram** — After Buram is surrendered to the Sudan government forces by a turncoat SPLA commander, the surrounding villages are attacked and scores are killed.

12/1993: **General** — Given a scorched earth policy, there was practically no 1993 harvest in the Nuba Mountains region.

### B-6 · Nuba: "Combing Operations"

Beginning in 1994, government forces attempted few major assaults on targets in the Nuba Mountains. Instead, the tactic of low-intensity warfare, or *tamshit* ("combing"), was employed, and the military would make it as difficult as possible for villagers to remain in the region.

Small units attacked defenseless villages after it was learned the SPLA was not in the vicinity. The attacks began with the onset of the dry season, and their object was to steal what one could, destroy the harvest, and torch homes. Attackers killed those who ran, while abductions of women and children were an integral part of the operation itself. Lack of food, shelter, and incipient starvation would lead Nuba to migrate to the larger towns where the government could force the displaced into Peace Villages and impose its control. Instead of major operations causing the deaths of thousands, there were a myriad of small incidents in hundreds of villages where a score of Nuba were killed here, and one or two there. The results were just as deadly, and thousands were killed outright. On occasion, operations were supported by helicopter gunships, MiG jets, and Antonov bombers.

Beginning in October 1991, the NSRCC denied Western INGO access to the Nuba Mountains. Despite an OLS-government of Sudan agreement reached on September 15, 1992,
which affirmed the "critical importance of access to all people in need of humanitarian assistance where ever they may be," the Nuba Mountains prohibition was not lifted until June 1994 when the government allowed the Save the Children Fund-United States to institute humanitarian assistance programs among the displaced at Dilling and Rashad.(36) Access to Kadugli was not allowed, however, until late 1996 when SCF/United States extended its activity to 16 Peace Villages located in and around Kadugli where "needs were great." The Khartoum government remained adamant, however, that no Western INGO operating under the OLS umbrella could conduct relief activities "in 'rebel-controlled' areas of the Nuba Hills."(37)

1-4/1994:  
*Tira Limon, Seraf Jamous, Oya* — Luman Hills east of Kadugli are pounded by artillery and villages occupied, looted and destroyed.

1/1994:  
*Nafia, Jebel Ashum, Heiban* — Numerous attacks. 228 killed at Jebel Ashum, 113 at Heiban. Mass killings and rapes are reported in the Shatt region and at Bangili and Tagoma, east of Dilling.(38)

1-5/1994:  
*Buram* — Continuous attacks on villages between Buram and Lake Abyad.

2/1994:  
*Kalkada* — Villages located near Mendi and on the southern edge of the Tira El Akhdar Hills south of Heiban are shelled and occupied. Many are killed, scores are abducted.(39)

4/1994:  
*Seraf Jamous, Arda* — Numerous attacks and scores are killed.

7/1994:  
*Kernalu* — Assassinations squads working out of Heiban emerge in the Heiban region. Village leaders and wealthy herders are targeted.

*Kauda* — Dry season attacks on Tira (Koalib-Moro) villagers emerge in the Heiban region. Village leaders and wealthy herders are targeted. Kauda Valley is occupied in the center-east; settlements are leveled and scores are killed.

9-11/1994:  
*Kalkada* — More than 200 "abducted" in the Tira El Akhdar Hills. In village after village, there are reports of deaths and terrified villagers escape to higher elevations.

10/1994-4/1995:  
*Tima Hills* — Attacks in October, January, March, and April south of Dilling leave more than 60 dead as the Sudan government forces occupy Tima town.

*Tira el Akhdar Hills* — Um Durdu and other villages are attacked causing numerous casualties.

11/1994-1/1995:  
*Otoro Hills* — In November, Otoro settlements at Tira al Akhdar are "combed"; a few are killed, 75 abducted. In January more than ten killed. Attacks on scattered villages continue in February. Widespread famine in the region forces 7,000 displaced to move into Peace Camps at Mendi, Abu Jibeha, Kalogi, and Heiban.

12/1994:  
*Buram* — Government forces employ a "scorched earth" policy, destroying villages south of Buram and to the west of the Mesakin and Korongo Angolo Hills.

**B-7 • Nuba: UN Commission on Human Rights Protests**

In 1995, famine conditions existed in most parts of the Nuba Mountains, while human rights organizations were convinced that "hundreds of thousands" had died in massacres occurring in the Nuba Mountains.(40) In March 1995, a cease-fire was arranged in south Sudan so that the guinea worm epidemic could be attacked. In the Nuba Mountains, where health conditions were execrable and a kala-azar epidemic continued unchecked in the southernmost region, no health
campaign was initiated.(41) While the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society argued the health conditions problem "in the Mountains is severe,"(42) the government stepped up its "combing" operations in the Nuba Mountains. There would be no let-up with regard to attacks on Nuba leadership, and assassination squads that received their orders from the government officials at Heiban were very active, targeting teachers and "justices of the peace" who operated in SPLA-controlled areas.(43)

Gaspar Biro, the UN rapporteur on human rights conditions in the Sudan, reported that a series of inhumane acts had been sponsored by the Khartoum government in the Nuba Mountains. He noted the relocation of thousands of Nuba, including the irrational movement of thousands to ghastly camps located outside Port Sudan in the Red Sea region where they were left to rot. In his report issued in February 1996, Biro noted: "In the Nuba Mountains, a large number of civilians, including women and children, Muslims, and Christians alike, have been killed in [aerial] attacks or summarily executed."(44) He noted in particular a June 1995 air attack on Regifi and judged that the government tactic was designed to force villagers to flee and thus depopulate the region.

1/1995: Angolo — Seventeen civilians were killed and 35 injured in a government attack that destroys Angolo itself. Crops are destroyed, food supplies are stolen, and all cattle — considered by many Nuba to be nearly as important as life itself — are taken from one of the richest regions of the Nuba Mountains.


2/1995: Lupi, Karakaya, Gardud el Hameid — Various artillery and ground attacks displace thousands. 300 houses are burned in Karakaya and "many people died." Some 70 are abducted in villages where 250 had already been abducted in the Lake Abyad region.

2/1995: Toror — Village is attacked, some deaths result, and nearly 300 are abducted.

2/1995: Abri, Dere, Bario, Tanfoli — A large military force attacks south of Dellami town killing "all unarmed civilians who crossed the army's path."(45)

2-3/1995: Dellami, Tuberi — Numerous attacks are reported with numerous killings and abductions.

3/1995: South Sudan — Although a cease-fire comes into effect in March 1995 in southern Sudan, the government continues its relentless attacks on Nuba villages.

3/1995: Angolo — Reports of burning and looting of scores of villages by a Nuba PDF battalion commanded by the Sudan military. PDF are paid a bounty for women and children captured. All able bodied males are killed.

3/1995: Kauda Valley — Army operations force thousands to flee to the Otoro Hills. Many abductions reported.

3-04/1995: Kawalib (Koalib) Hills — Abri and other villages found south of Dallami are attacked. More than 500 are abducted, and "about 70 were killed."(46)

3/95: Kuchama — Village attacked by SAF from Heiban. "Many were slaughtered."(46)

4/1995: Korongo Hills — The Korongo settlements southwest of Kadugli and in the vicinity of Korongo Abdallah are attacked. For the first time it is noted that the government deploys anti-personnel mines in the Nuba Hills.


4-5/1995: Seraf Jamous, Arda — Artillery and small unit attacks on settlements are reported.

4/1995: Moro Hills, Otoro Hills — Nearly 100 homes are destroyed in Dabker and many are killed in "combing" operations in the Moro Hills, and in the Otoro Hills located west of Kauda on the Haiban-Talodi road. Tura village is leveled.
5/1995: *Fariang* — Turncoat SPLA commander surrenders Fariang district. The Sudan government follows with a campaign to level Nuba villages located to the north.

6-7/1995: *Regife* — Bombings leave at least six dead and 13 injured.(47) The UN reports that bombing attacks on this densely populated area was "indicating an intent" to force civilians to flee the region.(48)

6/1995: *Ormache* — Twenty-one killed and 104 abducted in this Heiban county village.(49)


**B-8 • Nuba: Trying to Survive**

In October 1995, a Nuba journal published in Great Britain reported: "Everywhere we turn in the Nuba Mountains, the Sudan government is destroying villages, committing atrocities, and building 'peace villages' that contain imprisoned civilians."(50) In December 1995, International Christian Concern published unsubstantiated reports that the Sudan Air Force had dropped napalm on three sites in the Nuba Mountains causing the killing and wounding of thousands. True or not, by 1996 there were only an estimated 250,000-300,000 Nuba left in SPLA-administered regions. Only seven Christian pastors were still active in the region, and the indigenous Muslim *ulema* were everywhere under attack.

Still, following the success of SPLA attacks in Equatoria, and the growing presence of NDA forces in Blue Nile, the feeling was that the outgunned SPLA would soon be re-armed. In 1997, outsiders who visited the region learned that of "eight massive military columns" that had just penetrated the SPLA region, six were repulsed. The two that got through, however, "devastated many villages, burning crops, vandalizing churches, destroying villages, looting livestock and murdering many villagers."(51)


7/1996: *Debi, Eri* — Attacks by Sudan government forces; Debi, an Otoro village, was occupied and surrounding villages were burned.


1/1997: *Debri (Debi)* — A major battleground in the Otoro Hills results in the displacement of thousands.

2/1997: *Adudu* — Village destroyed and atrocities reported.(52)

2-3/1997: *Debri, Heiban, Ungurban, Buram* — During unauthorized visit, eyewitnesses observe bomb damage, interview Nuba, and barely escape MI-4(Hind) helicopter attack. It is estimated that attacks have created 15,000 displaced in Heiban, 25,000 in Ugurban as a result of a "scorched earth" campaign, and 12,000 in villages near Buram.(53)

03/1997: *Jebel Abyad, Nakar Hills* — Villages located in an area about 90 miles south of Dilling in eastern Nuba Mountains are attacked and occupied. Reports of many deaths.
Nuba: The Final Solution?

In 1997, the UN’s World Food Program began the distribution of food aid to so-called “peace villages” in Kadugli Province. By then it was obvious to observers that rape was an integral aspect of the government plan for the Nuba. Thousands of abducted women were raped while being transported from Nuba settlements to peace villages. Careful investigators would note: "Every woman interviewed...who has been taken to a peace camp has been raped or threatened with rape."(54)

Economically, it seemed the Khartoum government had achieved one of its major goals when the SPLA was forced to retreat from a large region south of Dilling. Shortly thereafter, one million acres of prime sorghum and sesame cultivation claimed by Koalib Nuba and east of the Kawalib range would be given over to Sudanese Arabs.

In August, Christian Solidarity International appeared before the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva and accused "the Sudan regime of condoning the abduction and enslavement of people from religious and ethnic minorities." Nevertheless, despite international criticism there was no let-up in government attacks on the Nuba people. Politically, it seemed that a "final solution" for the Nuba was decided upon in December 1997, when the government named the minister Minister of Interior, Bakri Hassan Salih, to take charge of Transitional Council of Southern Kordofan. As President Bashir explained it, the government was about to initiate a campaign of "peace by force" in the Nuba Mountains.(55)

By mid-1998, the government objectives in the Nuba Mountains had nearly been accomplished. The government had created 72 Peace Villages with an estimated population of some 172,000 people, 60 percent of whom were called "war affected Nubans." Nonetheless, the SPLA endured.

In a 1997 OLS assessment, 41 Peace Villages and 106,000 people were found "most vulnerable" because crop production had "barely reached" subsistence levels; a food deficit approaching 40 percent was estimated for the period May to August 1998.(56) In May, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urged Sudan government approval of air flights to the Nuba Mountains in order to "deliver food to the 20,000 people that local aid workers say are at risk of starvation."(57) The appeal worked, and the UN "warmly welcomed" the Sudan government announcement that "it would, for the first time, grant access to rebel-held areas [south and northeast, west of Talodi Province and south of Dilling] of the Nuba Mountains," where "several thousands of people in rebel-held areas" had been displaced and were "facing severe food shortages."(58) The SPLA admitted that "tens of thousands of their people are at risk from famine and disease," but it wanted "nothing to do with foreign aid if it is controlled by the government."(59) It would only accept food aid flown in from Lokichoggio. However, the UN soon reported that the assessment would be postponed until June 1998.(60)

INGOs delivered 13,000 pounds of sorghum to an airstrip near SPLA Commander Yousif Kuwa Makki’s headquarters—enough to feed about 500 people for a month.(61) It was very little, but it was a start. Unfortunately, the honeymoon did not last long. In July 1998, Khartoum media reported that fighting had resumed, while 50,000 people had arrived in Kadugli after fleeing internecine warfare in Al-Wihda state involving Nuer militias of Riak Machar and Paulino Matep.
6-7/1998: Kadugli — A government fact-finding mission to Al-Wihda state indicates "vast damage inflicted on government installations and development projects. Many deaths result from clashes between the South Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM/A), led by Paulino Matep, and the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) of Riak Machar. Tens of thousands "of Al-Wihda" people flee the region for the relative safety of "the Nuba Mountains and west Kordofan."(62)

7/1998: Ajroun — Clashes between SPLA and government forces near the "Ajroun Mountains," the "headquarters of SPLA forces of Yousuf Kuwah," create thousands of displaced. The government confirms the actual and expected arrival of 60,000 displaced at Kadugli and "appealed to national nongovernmental organisations to provide humanitarian assistance."(63)

7/1998: General — Recent government attacks had "displaced some 25,000 from the valleys." Despite government announcements, an assessment team was denied permission to carry out a survey. One report had it: "The result of a 10-year blockade" in the Nuba Mountains "has been the reversion to a virtual Stone Age existence."(64)

10/1998: General — The government response has been "to refuse permission to the UN to deliver food." Withholding food is thus used as deliberate policy to depopulate the land..., [and] the price of imposing such a policy is death for thousands.(65)

B-10 • Nuba: Conclusion

Taking either the population estimate of 1.3 million Nuba people in 1988 (estimated by de Waal of African Rights), or the estimate usually used (1.0 million), it can be said for certain that the Nuba have suffered enormously in the 1990s.

Assuming:

(1) There are 250,000 Nubans located under SPLA administration (although the figure could be somewhat less).

(2) The Khartoum government achieved its February 1992 goal of resettling 500,000 Nuba displaced people (although in mid-1998 the government counted only 72 Peace Villages with an estimated population of some 172,000 people, 60 percent of whom were called "war affected Nubans").

(3) There are 100,000 Nubans who have moved from the Nuba Mountains region, including those found in displaced persons camps from Khartoum through North Kordofan.

(4) That 50,000 Nubans have joined the PDF or the military, or are active in urban centers and exist outside of the Peace Camps milieu created for Nubas in South Kordofan.

If one assumes a population of one million Nuba in 1983, and even discounting a natural annual population growth estimated at 3 percent, at a minimum, more than 100,000 Nubans have disappeared. Given an estimated population growth of 3.0 percent per annum, the Nuba population loss likely has exceeded 200,000 persons since the NSRCC came to power on June 30, 1989.
The Nuba who have been lost through acculturation, deracination, and the results of "ethnic cleansing" can only be guessed.

B-11 • Footnotes to Section IV, Part B, "The Nuba Genocide"


(5) R. C. Stevenson, op cit; a recent effort published in 1995 by the World Evangelization Research Center was able to enumerate 270,000 Nuba in 12 ethnic groupings.


(7) Recently, the figure was used by Stephen Buckley and Karl Vick, "Nuba Caught Up in Sudan's Civil War," Washington Post/International-Guardian Weekly, United Kingdom, June 16, 1998.


(10) John Prendergast and Nancy Hopkins, "For Four Years I Have No Rest': Greed and Holy War in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan," Center of Concern, Washington, D.C., October 1994.

(11) Ibid., page 31.


(14) U.S. Embassy Cable 4657, Khartoum, June 18, 1992.


(18) Ibid., pages 112-116.

(19) Ibid., page 116.


(22) Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan, op cit, page 120.

(23) John Prendergast and Nancy Hopkins, op cit.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid., page 33.


(27) Ibid., page 6.
(30) Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan, op cit, page 244.
(32) John Prendergast and Nancy Hopkins, op cit.
(37) U.S. Department of State, Cable 220661, Washington D.C., October 23, 1996.
(38) John Prendergast and Nancy Hopkins, op cit, pages 33-34.
(40) See the report and map of Kees Hulsman, Trouw, The Netherlands, February 17, 1995.
(53) Ibid.
(54) Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan, op cit, page 221.
(59) Corinne Dufka, *op cit.*
C. TOTAL WAR IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

C-1 · Total War: War-Related Deaths 1994-1998

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By 1994, it was clear that the Khartoum government was determined to destroy forever the SPLA as a fighting force. The Sudan Armed Forces were everywhere on the attack, and the SPLA was barely able to defend the small pockets under its control in southernmost Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal. The Khartoum government seemed determined to crush the spirit of all southern Sudanese and, as it was necessary to gain control of the region totally to extirpate southern culture.

Neither the Khartoum government nor the Sudan military was disposed to recognize the Law of Armed Conflict, or that modern body of obligations which imposes limits on armed hostilities and thus serves as "the cornerstone of military operations." In the 20th century, the Law of Armed Conflict has received widespread international recognition: So much so, that it has become "part of international humanitarian law and is designed to diminish the effects of conflicts by protecting combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering."(1) Unfortunately, war in southern Sudan is hell, and the Sudan government has made sure that no southerner forgets it.

Following a visit to southern Sudan in June 1996, Christian Solidarity International issued a report that noted: "The mass displacement of the population of the South and the Nuba Mountains, by means of aerial and ground attacks on civilians, slavery, and the manipulation of humanitarian aid are major features of the policy of genocide, which has already resulted in the deaths of over 1.5 million and the displacement of over 5 million people, out of a population of no more than 8 million in the war zone."(2)

In one of the more ghastly reminders of the extent of southern deprivation, in January 1998, Henk Franken, UNICEF representative in Sudan, claimed that between 1996 and 1997: "More than one million children," most of them from strife-torn southern Sudan, "died of polio and malnutrition-related diseases."(3) It is an incredible figure and a total much larger than the author had ever assumed. Nonetheless, the claim, made by a judicious UN official, cannot be taken lightly. It certainly serves as another reminder of just how appalling an impact the civil war in Sudan has had.

C-2 · Total War: Substantive Data on Equatoria & Upper Nile in 1994

Following the government declaration of a Holy War (jihad) against the SPLA in 1993, the Sudanese military made practically no attempt to differentiate between friend and foe or civilian and
military in southern Sudan. The enormity of the human suffering resulting from a decade-old civil war was given wide publicity by the spiritual head of the Church of England, the Archbishop of Canterbury, following his unauthorized visit to southern Sudan in 1994. Despite his efforts, and those of the Operation Lifeline Sudan participants, to publicize the extent of the deprivation in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, the international response to the potentially dangerous food supply conditions was quite tepid. In northern Bahr al-Ghazal, and along an arc stretching from Nasir in Upper Nile to Labone in the southern sector of eastern Equatoria, many villages and hundreds of thousands of villagers were "at risk" and would remain so throughout 1994.

In addition to the food shortages, there were reports of an increase in polio and measles in southern Sudan. Malaria had become a killer disease nearly everywhere in the region. The USAID-sponsored Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) monitors reported in January 1994 that "mortality and morbidity rates are higher in the south than for all of Sudan, with infant mortality rates reaching 170 deaths per 1,000 live births as opposed to 100 per 1,000 for all Sudan."(4)

At a May 1994 meeting of Horn of Africa nations seeking to achieve peace in the Sudan, the Inter-Governmental Agency Against Drought and Desertification (IGADD), now known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, was warned that if no agreement were reached between the Khartoum government and the SPLA on the movement of humanitarian aid "tens of thousands of Sudanese will die as a result of starvation and disease."(5) At the meeting, an agreement was reached which improved air access to southern Sudan; the antagonists agreed to respect the institution of air flights to 73 locations, to open a river passage between Akobo and Pibor, and respect three overland transport corridors, two from Kenya and one from Uganda. Unfortunately, it was a compact that Khartoum government respected and rejected at will.

In late 1994, OLS determined that 3.6 million southern Sudanese would require "some form of relief assistance"; despite the fact that the October-December harvest had been "abundant" in the North, the Khartoum government offered no real relief to the hunger-stricken in southern Sudan. Thus, OLS estimated that some 720,000 southern Sudanese would require food aid from international donors.(6)

In 1994, the Sudan military seized the offensive in southern Sudan, and its numerous campaigns caused the dispersal of tens of thousands of internally displaced, and led still more thousands to seek asylum in Kenya and Uganda. In December, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the Khartoum government for "conducting air attacks against innocent civilians, and impeding international relief efforts."(7)

**C-3 • Total War: Equatoria in 1994**

In January 1994, the Sudan military increased its raids on civilian targets. Ominously, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel movement, began to operate out of bases controlled by the Sudan military. Given the large number of internally displaced people at Juba, UN/WFP attempted to move large quantities of food aid by barge. After two months of haggling, barges loaded with 2,380 tons of food aid were dispatched from Kosti in the autumn. It was the sixth such UN/WFP effort begun since late 1992 and was in large part responsible for reducing the incidence of famine at villages in Upper Nile and at Juba, the capital of Equatoria.

1/1994: *Ikotos, Napotpot* — Hunger is widespread among the displaced at Ikotos and among the 6,000 displaced from the Kajo Kaji region who settled at Napotpot.

1/1994: *Nimule, Ame, Atepi* — More than 100,000 are displaced in the "Nimule Corridor"; when nearby villages are attacked, the displaced at the Ame and Atepi camps—where hundreds of children died of malnutrition, malaria, and other diseases were buried—thousands of displaced began to move toward Uganda.

1/1994: *Labone, Parajok* — Food distribution to thousands of needy displaced is "disrupted by air strikes and ground attacks."(8) Many displaced cross the Uganda border after government air bombardments.


1/1994: *Narus, Chukudum* — CRS reports "emergency medicine needs" in its area of operation.

1/1994: *Pageri, Awe* — Villagers located between Pageri and Awe are on the move as fighting moves into the region. The U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, reports that many "need assistance."(9)

3/1994: *Kajo Kaji, Kaya* — World Concern requests emergency food rations for 72,000 needy.

4/1994: *Lopit* — OLS receives reports that in eastern Equatoria food needs are greatest among the scattered mountain villages of this region.

6/1994: *Loka* — At least 73 families are abducted; men are interrogated and those considered SPLA supporters are killed.(10)

7-12/1994: *Lafon* — The SSIA of Riak Machar steal food meant for orphaned boys. Some 47 deaths reported.(11)

9/1994: *Juba* — The incidence of malnutrition found in children under age five increases from 22 percent in 1993 to 27 percent. Lutheran World Service and UN/WFP airlifts manage to alleviate but not end hunger conditions in Juba itself. Many starvation deaths are reported.

10/1994: *Lowoi* — Scores of people are killed as SSIM/A forces are reported "killing, looting and raping women and children" in eastern Equatoria.(12)

10-12/1994: *Border region* — Bombers continue to raid as an average of 20,000 Sudanese refugees a month cross the border into Uganda.

11-12/1994: *Kapoeta* — Continuous fighting in the region causes death and injury for hundreds of villagers. The displaced flee toward the south; in November, the New Cush camp located near Lotukei is founded for 5,000 displaced people.(13) Fighting continues through December.


12/1994: *Lopit, Lohutojo* — NPA reports no relief food has reached the West Lopit region in weeks due to insecurity. Reports reach Nairobi of pre-famine conditions.
c-4 • Total War: Upper Nile in 1994

In 1994, the military situation in Upper Nile was confused as militias fought militias—as the SPLA fought the government-backed SSIA (South Sudan Independence Army) forces of Riak Machar, the SPLA-United faction of Lam Akol, and the Sudan government occupied villages wherever it could.

Large population movements were reported in eastern Upper Nile, where relief agencies found it nearly impossible to maintain operations. Malaria and other diseases reportedly took tens of thousands of lives. In Parieng District, northern Upper Nile, local officials indicated that kala-azar had wiped out about "half of the Panaru [Dinka] people," and given the absence of medical support, SPLA advisors worried that all Dinka in that region were threatened by the disease.(14) Elsewhere, MSF reported that in western Upper Nile alone "40,000 people have died" from the disease.(15)

Hunger became widespread as the tribes armed by the government fought with the SPLA. Shilluk villages along the Nile were attacked by the SSIA and by a pro-government militia—the Anyanya II—led by Gabriel Tang-Ginya. The distribution of food could no longer be controlled by the aid and INGO institutions, and in one notorious incident, the forces of Lam Akol abducted a WFP food relief barge that had arrived at Tonga.(16) Fighting, displacement, and disease were so commonplace that in early 1995 one observer stated that in the period 1992-1994, "over 50,000 persons died" solely in that region occupied by the Jikeny and Lou Nuer east of the White Nile.(17)

12/1993-1/1994: Waat and Ayod — Famine conditions were noted at Waat in December and continued through January. A mortality rate of 9.7 per 10,000/per day is reported for those under five years old. Global acute malnutrition for those from 6-59 months was 17.4 percent. Hundreds die. At Ayod, severe malnutrition is reported among children.(18)

1/1994: Jonglei, northern Upper Nile — FEWS reports that the two regions "will remain crisis areas" for the foreseeable future.(19)

2/1994: Chotbora — In the Jikany Nuer region, investigators find severe malnutrition among 6 percent of the population and 23 percent global malnutrition at Chotbora 40 kms north of Nasir.

2/1994: Northern Upper Nile — A split in Nuer ranks leads to a series of battles between the Lou Nuer (located between Kongor and Akobo and including the towns of Ayod, Waat and Yuai) and Jikany Nuer (from the Sobat River region). It soon involves ethnic Shilluk loyal to Lam Akol.

2/1994: Bieh, Latjor — In fighting involving the Jikany and Lou Nuer, the "destructive violence" resulted in "over a thousand deaths of civilians including women and children."

3/1994: Maiwut — In tribal clashes, the village is leveled and hundreds flee.(20)

4/1994: Waat — Nearby fighting leads thousands of displaced to move toward Waat. Global acute malnutrition among children under five increased in April to 24.8 percent of the population and mortality of those under age five increased from an alarming 9.7/10,000 a day to 11.2/10,000. Many deaths are reported, and the UN/WHO calls the situation a "major catastrophe."(21)
6-8/1994: Fanjak, Manajang — The Shilluk, armed by Khartoum and working in conjunction with the Tang-ginya militia, attack villages in the region. Hundreds are killed.

6-7/1994: Kongor, Olang — ICRC relief flights provide assistance to "40,000 victims."(22)

7/1994: Malakal — High market prices for sorghum affect some 26,000 displaced people. Hundreds return to village in search of food.

8/1994: Maiwut — International Rescue Committee provides support to thousands who fled tribal clashes around Nasir.(23)


8-10/1994: Akobo — The internecine struggle between SSIM's Nuer and between Nuer and other ethnic elements, including Anuak, Dinka Padang, and Shilluk, reaches its climax. Shilluk forces of Lam Akol abducted a WFP food relief barge in Tonga. A Jikany-Lou Nuer reconciliation is reached and truce is declared at an Akobo conference held in September.

12/1994: Pibor — Insecurity and food shortages cause thousands to flee the region. UNICEF notes high (24.4 percent) malnutrition rate and the prevalence of many untreated diseases at the Pibor feeding center.(24)

12/1994: Maiwut — Nuer and Shilluk militias clash. Civilians are caught up in the battle and scores are reported killed.

12/1994: Nasir — There is an extensive movement of people from Malakal, Ulang, and western Upper Nile; nearly 20,000 displaced congregate at Nasir, where food supplies are minimal.

1-12/1994: Chotbura, Sobat River Region — MSF-France reports that in 1994 there were new outbreaks of Kala Azar, the parasitical disease, "spread by a sand fly and fatal in a matter of months." In the "zones most affected by fighting, which were inaccessible to humanitarian operations, the disease was said to have "already contaminated more than 50,000 persons."(25)

C-5 • Total War: 1995 Overview

*The Khartoum government has "embarked on an armed crusade to mould its society into 'its own version of a radical Islamist agenda.'"

— Pierre Sane

Secretary General, Amnesty International, London, January 1995 (26)

In early 1995, an OLS assessment asserted that 1.2 million "war-affected and displaced beneficiaries" would require food aid in 1995.(27) In May, a senior Sudanese government official complained that the international community had "responded weakly to UN appeals for aid," stating that only $15 million of the $101 million requested had arrived. In fact, most Western countries had reduced development aid following repeated U.N. condemnations of human rights violations, but continued to offer emergency relief aid to war-affected areas.(28)
At mid-year, another assessment found that 4.25 million war-affected would require some relief assistance, including 3.6 million in southern Sudan."(29) FEWS reported that 1.8 million southern Sudanese displaced people were located in the Khartoum region, while 500,000 were found in southern Sudan itself.(30)

In January 1995, the government halted OLS flights to Maiwut, Pariang, Boma, Chukudum, Mundri, Nimule, and Ikotos. Throughout the year and into 1996, the government reneged on agreements it had signed with the UN, constantly placing restrictions and prohibitions on flight clearances of food aid, whether from Kenya or Uganda, and practically proscribed the use of large cargo aircraft.(31) OLS participants complained that most food shipped from the North by barge or rail was diverted to private hands and never reached the needy.(32) In September, the government halted the flight of C-130 aircraft to southern Sudan and continued the prohibition for the rest of the year.

In March, former President of the United States Jimmy Carter brokered a cease-fire that allowed efforts to reduce the incidence of river blindness disease in southern Sudan. Although the cease-fire held through August, "instability" remained the "number one factor influencing vulnerability in southern Sudan; once the cease-fire ended, "attacks by rebel and government forces continue[d] to kill civilians, destroy food security resources" and displace the most vulnerable.(33)

In November, Baroness Cox of Christian Solidarity International reported that during her unauthorized visits to southern Sudan in 1995: "We witnessed the effects of the policy of no-go [no food airlifts] areas in places as far apart as Pariang, Marial, and Mayen Abun in Bahr al Ghazal to Loronyo in eastern Equatoria. People in the hundreds were dying around us of starvation and disease. ...we often found ghost villages whose inhabitants had died of starvation. Others were dying in front of our eyes."(34)

At year's end, the FAO reported that the 1995 food crop was "estimated to cover less than half of the consumption requirements in the southern Sudan." Sorghum prices in Wau were already five times higher than they were "in the surplus area of Renk"—a certain indication of tough times to come in the capital of Bahr al-Ghazal and elsewhere in the South.(35)

**C-6 • Total War: Equatoria in 1995**

1/1995: **Kapoeta** — Fighting continues with scores of dead and wounded civilians. Thousands of displaced people move south to Napotpot and Narus.

1/1995: **Rokon, Morobo, Nimule** — Widespread fighting affects scores of villages. Thousands of civilians flee to Juba or toward the south. There is a huge influx of desperate displaced at Yomciir.

1/1995: **Nimule** is shelled.

1/1995: **Palwar, Parajok** — Fighting between the SPLA and government-supported SSIA and LRA elements creates more displaced people; they move toward Labone where 60,000 displaced people have already congregated.

2/1995: **Amadi, Nimule** — Insecurity continues. Nimule is shelled day and night between February 18-20. Roads in northern Uganda are insecure, and scores of civilians are injured and killed. The government and LPA plant landmines, especially
around Gulu town. On February 9, hundreds of displaced people flee the Labone camp following skirmishing and government shelling. Reports that 55,000 displaced are generated.(36)

2/1995: *Torit* — The UN/WFP reports that 10,600 displaced people in town are in need of emergency food aid.


4/1995: *Lafon* — Lafon is bombed, and thousands of townspeople and villagers flee fighting in the region. UNICEF, CARE and NCA are forced to evacuate.(37)


6/1995: *Juba* — It is reported that the Sudan military have ringed Juba with minefields extending out as far as 60 miles. Thousands of civilian casualties result from indiscriminate mining at Juba and elsewhere in Equatoria. Elsewhere, the Juba civil hospital serves as the "last step before the grave." It has practically no ability to respond to famine or disease; thousands of tuberculosis patients are registered but endure without access to medicine.(38)


8/1995: *Koboko Camp, Uganda* — Thousands of civilians flee to Uganda. Koboko camp, housing 65,000 Sudanese, is shelled by the Sudan army, which fires across the border. Hundreds of Sudanese who died from malnutrition, malaria, and other diseases in the period 1994-95 are buried near the camp.

10/1995: *Ambo, Tambura* — After the Sudan government grounds a Belgian C-130, the principal aircraft operating from Lokichoggio involved in relief flights, even relief personnel survive on limited rations in these food deficit areas.

10/1995: *Juba* — Barges earmarked for Juba are stalled at Kosti. "Serious food shortages are expected" by November.(40)

11/1995: *Yambio* — A bombing attack leaves many dead and wounded. The attacks are characterized as "part of a general campaign by Khartoum to terrorize people."(41)

12/1995: *Morobo* — Fighting between the SPLA and the Uganda forces of Colonel Juma Oris and his rebel West Nile Bank Front causes scores of civilian casualties and leads hundreds to flee to Zaire and Uganda.(42)
"Like everyone in Akobo, Peter's life has been one long series of uprootings and losses. He was a refugee in Ethiopia for seven years. His father was killed in the war. His mother died from hunger. Aunts and uncles, brothers and sisters, in-laws, cousins, friends - 'so many' also died. 'We are suffering indeed from hunger.'"

— Eyewitness account: Akobo, Upper Nile, February 1996.(43)

In the 1995, UN/WFP food assistance program, some 207,000 people are found in the Jonglei region.(44) Nevertheless, Operation Lifeline Sudan was nearly excluded from work in northern Upper Nile. The Nuer, who had spent 1994 fighting with all the surrounding tribes, continued to fight among themselves to the great detriment of the Lou and the Jikany Nuer populations.

And after the Shilluk split with the Tang-ginya militia in early 1995, the Khartoum government created a situation of permanent instability between Nuer and Shilluk. The resulting internecine warfare, which the government made no move to halt, would lead to the deaths of thousands and the displacement of tens of thousands.

Widespread starvation would follow after the Tang-ginya denied the movement of relief supplies to the needy in the Zeraf Valley.

In 1994 and 1995, the SSIA and the SPLA clashed on numerous occasions. The "Lafon Declaration" signed on April 27, 1995, however, seemed to produce a welcome peace between the two forces. Unfortunately, the agreement was broken off when SSIA Commander William Nyoun Bany announced a coup against Riak in mid-1995 and moved his forces to Ayod, Upper Nile. For the rest of the year, anarchy existed because of widespread interfactional fighting in eastern Upper Nile.

In spring 1995, the Khartoum government urged UNICEF and INGOs to support the return of thousands of displaced people from Khartoum to the Bentiu/Leer/Adok region. Given regional insecurity, expatriate aid agencies were practically precluded from participating in the program. Thus, the displaced persons' return to village program received very little outside report and in general only added to the misery in Upper Nile.(45)

1/1995: Chotbura/Akobo — MSF-Holland is relocated because of widespread cattle raiding and militia attacks.
1/1995: Fanjak — Many civilians killed and wounded in militia raids.
1-2/1995: Waat, Ayod, Nasir, and Akobo — OLS reports that relief centers are insecure following the attack and subsequent abduction of relief workers from Waat and fighting between Sudan government and SSIA forces along the Sobat River.
2/1995: Bailiet — Sudan government and SSIA forces skirmish around Bailiet and along the Sobat River. Scores are killed.
2/1995: Akobo — Emergency conditions exist as 10,000 displaced people arrive after fleeing warfare in eastern Upper Nile. UNICEF and INGOs return staff to the region. In late February, the UN/WFP begins airdropping food at Yuai and Waat.
2/1995: **Sobat Basin** — All INGO staff are evacuated from Nasir and Akobo due to fighting.

3/1995: **Nabagok, Thiet** — Surrounding villages are deserted. Nasir is described as "quiet but unstable" and few civilians are sighted.(47) At month's end, Nasir is occupied by Sudan government troops.

3/1995: **Maiwut** — East of Nasir, food shortages "caused by the flight of INGOs" cause evacuation of many villages. Many Sudanese move to Ethiopia.(48)

3/1995: **Mankien, Madeng** — OLS-Nairobi reports that 28,000 needy southerners fleeing the fighting in Mayen Abun, Turalie, Mongola, and Bar arrive in Upper Nile.(49)

4/1995: **Yuai, Waat** — Interfactional fighting near Yuai leaves scores dead. Thousands of civilians leave crops in the field and flee with their cattle toward Lanken.

4-5/1995: **Fanjak, Pagak** — Militia raiding leaves many dead at Fanjak and to the north at Pariang in western Upper Nile. There are reports of militia fighting along the Sobat River, and more than 5,000 displaced, many from Pagak, arrive at Mading.

5/1995: **Chotbura** — Sudan government troops overrun Chotbura, thousands flee to Longchuk.

5/1995: **Pariang** — In violation of the guinea-worm eradication cease-fire, government forces attack and occupy Pariang town. Scores of civilians are killed.

5-6/1995: **Akobo** — OLS relief activity is nearly halted due to widespread militia activity in Jonglei region. The Sudan government halts food aid flights to Pagak, Pariang, Maiwut.

5-8/1995: **Maiwut, Mading, Pakok, Daga Post** — The Sudan government prohibits NGO flights to regions where desperately needy displaced have congregated.(50)

6/1995: **Ayod, Waat, Panyok** — Severe fighting involving SSIM and SPLA levels many villages.

6/1995: **Northern Upper Nile** — Cattle raiding causes the destruction of villages and greatly reduces cattle herds. Some 2,250 tons of food aid is offloaded from barges at 24 drop-off points between Malakal and Juba. OLS finds that in the region between Ganyliel and Bor there is a very high rate of infant malnutrition.(51)

6-8/1995: **Duk Fadiet** — Dinka-Bor skirmishing causes hundreds of civilian casualties.

6-7/1995: **Akobo** — OLS relief activity is disrupted by warfare. Akobo, Waat, and Ayod all experience drought conditions.

7/1995: **Fanjak** — The government reports that a local chief complains that SPLA attacks "killed 49 people" in Jonglei province.(52)

8/1995: **Ganyliel** — Nearly 200 are killed and 50 wounded in cattle rustling raid on Nuer settlements in Leer County. The SPLA is blamed for an attack on an SSIA village, said to revenge the death and destruction of Panyagor, a Dinka settlement in Kongor County, some twenty-five miles distant. The SPLA denied responsibility and blamed the attack on armed cattle raiders.(53)

8-12/1995: **Akobo, Waat, Kaikwuni, Ayod and Fanjak** — A split in the SSIM/A ranks led the insurgent William Nyuan Bany to lead a revolt against Nuer leader Riak Machar. Clashes between forces of Riak and William lead to more than a thousand deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands.

9-10/1995: **Ayod** — Bombing raids cause the displacement of thousands of civilians.

10/1995: **Waat, Akobo, Ayod** — Vicious fighting is reported in central Upper Nile and northern Jonglei. Populations are displaced and widespread crop damage is reported in a meager crop year. Insecurity precludes either an UN or INGO assessment of the extensive damage and incipient famine.(54)

10/1995: **Thiet** — Intra-clan fighting leaves scores dead.

11/1995: **Waat, Ayod** — As fighting continues, the area is reportedly "deserted of civilians."(55)
In January, Sudan's Minister of Agriculture Ali Ganeif reported that Sudan "does not need food aid because it produces enough to feed its people." Even though UNICEF reported "great concern on all fronts for the people in the turbulent regions of the northern Bahr al Ghazal, Jonglei, and eastern Upper Nile" because fighting had prevented an OLS "harvest assessment" (56), the Minister argued that the harvest in southern Sudan "was also good with production covering 53 percent of the region's needs." (57) Still, the Khartoum government would offer no food aid for southerners even though OLS predicted that 720,000 displaced/affected in southern Sudan would require "emergency food and non-food assistance" in 1996 (58).

By February, OLS was reporting that food security was "mixed" in southern Sudan. The most needy were located in Bahr al-Ghazal, but there were pockets of need at Torit and Kapoeta in eastern Equatoria and Nasir and Kongor in Upper Nile. (59) The NIF government, however, continued to preclude the use of C-130 planes to undertake urgent airlifts, and it denied OLS access to many areas that had previously been subject to agreement. When the pace of OLS food deliveries slowed to a crawl, in July UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali expressed his concern with Khartoum's "unilateral and unjustified obstruction" of humanitarian aid to southern Sudan. The UN Secretary General expressed his deep concern with "the recent serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the Sudan as a result of the unilateral and unjustified obstruction by the government of the Sudan of urgently required humanitarian assistance" to 700,000 needy in southern Sudan. (60) Thanks to his effort, the Khartoum government gave way, and a few days later, OLS resumed C-130 airdrops to people most affected "by food shortages and floods in southern Sudan." (61)

The government of Sudan continued in its role of unwilling participant in Operation Lifeline Sudan, and at year's end the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/OCHA) noted numerous disruptions in the humanitarian assistance program in southern Sudan. They included: occasional and prolonged total flight bans on the use of humanitarian aircraft; imposition of no-fly zones along the Sudan-Uganda border; and "denial of flight clearances to locations severely affected by the spread of cholera and severe diarrheal diseases. In the latter case, UN and INGO reports noted the "Sudan government refusal" to allow OLS "access to certain locations affected by cholera and severe diarrhoeal-related diseases." (62) Reports compiled in May and June confirmed "over 700 deaths" and suggested that there was "a much greater problem." (63) While Khartoum denied a problem existed, Mr. Anthony Rabi, UN/DHA argued that the number of deaths could exceed 1,800 people.

The UN/OCHA also claimed that the "interdiction" of C-130 cargo aircraft had reduced by 80 percent the movement of commodities from Lokichoggio, Kenya. Finally, it was noted that INGO personnel had to be evacuated more than 60 times in 35 separate locations (64), most as a result of Sudan government forces or militia action. Perhaps the most interesting statistic of all was that 21,000 tons of food relief had been delivered in 1996 to areas controlled by rebel forces.
Total War: Refugee Camps in 1996

4-5/1996: Kakuma — Mortality rate of children under five drops from 3.82 per thousand in March to 2.64 in April in Kenya refugee camp.

6/1996: Koboko — The Khartoum-supported WNBF attacked Sudanese refugee camp at Koboko, Uganda, where 50,000 were settled. Scores are killed.

7/1996: Agago/Acholi Pii — LRA rebels from Juba attack the UNHCR refugee camps in Northern Uganda and kill more than 150 Sudanese. Thousands of refugees are forced to relocate, many for the fourth or fifth time.

10/1996: Kitgum — LRA attacks a refugee settlement near Kitgum, killing more than 100 Sudanese. They constantly impede refugee access to health centers.

12/1996: Ikafe, Imvepi — There is "direct targeting" of Sudanese refugee camps in Uganda's West Nile province. Ikafe and Imvepi camps, home to 55,000 Sudanese, were attacked; homes were burned, at least 25,000 were re-displaced, and many Sudanese were "raped, abducted, and killed." Thousands fled toward SPLA-held Kajo Kaji.

Equatoria in 1996

1/1996: Maridi — Anglican investigation finds 5,000 civilians, many sick and hungry, living in miserable conditions.

2/1996: Torit, Magwe — OLS begins study of food needs in a region where intense fighting occurred in 1995. 16,000 people are in need of "immediate food aid."(68)

2/1996: Lopit — Fighting and flooding force villagers from the lowlands to the mountains. Crop production is reduced in Lopit and nearby villages of Lafon, Lohudo, Murhatkiri, and Lokiri. Widespread hunger results.

5/1996: Juba — Widespread hunger exists: "Juba would survive for only three months at most on local farm output."(70)


6-8/1996: Lui — Fierce fighting in the region kills scores of civilians and displaces thousands.


12/1996: Kajo Kaji, Bamurye — A "few deaths" reported among returnees to Kajo Kaji, while the health center at Bamurye registers scores of malnourished.

12/1996: Gaya, Bari, Labongwa — Some 5,000 former displaced people located east of the Yei River and northeast of Lanya town are reported to be "in desperate need of relief food."(72)
C-11 • Total War: Upper Nile in 1996

By mid-year, interfactional fighting switched from eastern Upper Nile to the Dinka villages of western Upper Nile and eastern Bahr al-Ghazal, and one source predicted there would be "more deaths from interfactional fighting than from the SPLA-GOS conflict."(73)

1/1996: *Duk Fadiet* — Interfactional fighting leaves many civilians killed and wounded.
3/1996: *Pochalla* — "At least" 860 civilians were reported killed "during fighting near the Ethiopian border."(74)
3-4/1996: *Bor region* — Government garrison carry-out punitive raids, burning villages and killing civilians.
6-7/1996: *Pochalla region* — The worst floods in 50 years leave 25,000 internally displaced.
OLS determines that at least 18,500 need immediate food relief. Pochalla itself has been cut off from relief aid since April, and 15,000 persons are stranded.(75) The OLS coordinator reported in June that "if nothing were done we are facing a humanitarian disaster."(76)
7/1996: *Akobo* — Following resumption of C-130 flights, the UN/WFP drops emergency food supplies to 30,000 people "in the area of Akobo, Jonglei province."(77)
7/1996: *Jonglei, Kongor, Duk Fadiet, Duk Fawil* — Preliminary OLS findings from the Pokap region indicate a need for two months food rations for 53,000 needy.
8-9/1996: *Pochalla* — OLS begins airdrops "following GOS approval for the resumption of relief flights." Flights "were subsequently interrupted in September, when all flights to Pochalla were redenied by the GOS."(78) Despite OLS problems, MSF-France provided emergency assistance to 43,000 ethnic Anuak.
9/1996: *Pibor* — Flooding cause extensive crop damage. Many displaced people move to Pibor town, where food shortages emerge and a high incidence of disease is noted among the people.
12/1996: *Bor* — A general population of 108,000 is declared "vulnerable due to flood," the worst in the region since 1961.(79)

C-12 • Total War: 1997 Overview

The year began explosively. In January, a joint SPLA and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) offensive was launched. The alliance between the two opposition groups, effected in October 1996, resulted in a succession of victories in the Red Sea and Blue Nile regions. In March, military action shifted to southern Equatoria. The SPLA captured Yei, and that action was followed by victories at Kaya and Kajo Kaji in western Equatoria. Following the SPLA offensive, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese displaced, including 100,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda, began to move again as they sought to return to villages in Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal.
Regionally, returning refugees were faced by food shortages, and INGOs had to gear up quickly to meet widespread needs.

In the wake of the SPLA and NDA victories, from March through June 1996 the Khartoum government banned all C-130 flights from the OLS basecamp at Lokichoggio, Kenya. Reports indicated that "the restrictions on OLS flights reduced food aid for more than 700,000 aid-dependent Sudanese and prevented the delivery of seeds and tools, affecting timely planting."(80) The SPLA gains did allow, however, the trucking of relief supplies from Uganda to Equatoria.

The February 1997, UN/WFP projections that about one-third of an estimated population of 3.393 million southern Sudanese were a "vulnerable population" had to be updated almost each week. In March, however, the Khartoum government denied flights to 33 locations, thus affecting more than 700,000 people in the "vulnerable population" category.

In August, an FAO spokesman in Nairobi indicated that "the overall food outlook in Sudan for 1997 has so far been generally satisfactory..." Nevertheless, he stated that six states in Darfur, Kordofan, Red Sea State, and in the South had an aggregate deficit of around 600,000 tons of cereals. In the South, "some 2.6 million war-affected and displaced persons would need emergency food aid estimated at 52,176 tons."(81)

In October, the UN/WFP finally loads its first barge convoy of the year, and 2,700 tons of emergency food were shipped to 380,000 needy found in Nile River villages and to Juba where desperate conditions existed.(82) OLS reported in November 1996 that "50 percent of the 4.6 million population of southern Sudan will face a localized cereal deficit" in 1997.(83) Northern Bahr al-Ghazal is considered the most endangered region.

C-13 • Total War: Refugee Camps in 1997

4/1997: Kakuna — Some 33,000 Sudanese refugees, including 12,000 "lost children," were reportedly "slowly dying of malnutrition" in Kenya.(84)

5/1997: Uganda — The UNHCR in Uganda reports thousands of starving Sudanese from Yei returning to refugee camps in Uganda. (85)

9/1997: Uganda Camps — Sudan refugee camps in Koboko and Arua were closed following the exodus of the remaining 25,000 Sudanese refugees returning to southern Sudan.

C-14 • Total War: Equatoria

A UN/WFP airlift into Juba began on April 10 to meet the urgent food aid needs of 14,540 displaced persons and refugees. In addition, the UN/WFP agreed to supply some 5,100 metric tons of food to help meet five months of food needs for 100,000 returnees in the Yei.

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Within days, however, numerous OLS relief flights into southern Sudan were halted due to widespread fighting. For months afterward, the Khartoum government repeatedly denied flight clearances. In July, the SPLA reports localized food shortages throughout Equatoria, but UN/WFP and UNICEF humanitarian flights into southern Sudan (about thirty flights a week) were halted by Sudanese authorities. The suspension was the subject of weeks of high level discussions between the UN organizations and the government of Sudan that resolved nothing.


2/1997: Maridi — Thousands of Sudanese fleeing the fighting in Zaire move toward Maridi. There are reports of rapes, robberies, and killings affecting those trying to return. (88)

2/1997: Mundri — More than 8,000 displaced by fighting in 1996 are reported in "serious condition" and in need of immediate food aid. (89) Returnees and displaced "were clearly in a desperate and vulnerable state." (90)


3-4/1997: Kajo Kaji — Scores of civilians killed as Kajo Kaji falls to the SPLA's "Operation Thunderbolt."

4/1997: Juba — UN/WFP orders an emergency airlift as regional fighting increases the number of displaced people. Meanwhile, Sudan warned OLS participants to avoid areas where fighting was occurring or risk being considered SPLA supporters. (91)

4/1997: Yei and Various — UN/WFP planned to supply some 5,100 metric tons of food to meet the April-August needs of 100,000 returnees. In April, OLS begins distributions to needy displaced people and former refugees at Mundri (6,000), Maridi (3,840), Yambio (7,000), and Yei (35,800).

4/1997: Kit-Juba Road — The SPLA attacks along the Kit-Juba road; six heavily fortified government garrisons are overrun including a huge Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) camp. Sudan army, LRA, and SSIA troops retreat, torching villages and firing on civilians.

4-5/1997: Mugale — More than 200 starving men, women, and children arrive at Mugale displaced people camp near the Ugandan border. They assert that famine is widespread inside Juba, and many Arab families had "already left for Khartoum." Some 155 people who had been in the group were "killed near Kit by gunfire and machetes in an ambush set by the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army." Atrocities were especially vicious near Aru, the LRA basecamp, 50 miles south of Juba. (92)

5-10/1997: Wonduruba — More than 10,000 people, mostly former government employees, congregate some 130 kilometers southwest of Juba. Hundreds die along the way, and many people die after reaching the village.

5/1997: Yei, Lanya, Kajo, Kaji — More than 55,000 refugees return from Uganda. There is, however, little food in towns captured by the SPLA. At Loka, 20 miles north of Yei, villagers claim that in a "bid to drain the countryside of support for the rebels" government soldiers had forced thousands of people into government-run "peace camps." There, food was short and conditions harsh and hundreds died. (93)

5/1997: Kaya to Lainya — NPA reports that people the government congregated in so-called "Peace Villages" reported how they were used "as slave labor and as a human shields between the NIF forces and the SPLA." Following the battle for Yei, it was learned that the government's policy had led to the death of many civilians whose "corpses" were seen "strewn all over the area." (94)
5/1997: Lobonok—Inhabitants who had been terrorized during the government occupation were bombarded by Sudan government and artillery after the SPLA captured the town. Inhabitants flee south toward Nimule, westward toward Kajo Kaji, or eastward into the hills.(95)

5-8/1997: Yeи—After the SPLA captures the fertile Yeи area, the UN/WFP rushes to supply food from Uganda for 100,000 returnees.

5-9/1997: Juba—Thousands of people "complaining of food shortages" flee the city when a scheduled food aid barge does not arrive.(96) NGOs report food shortages and persecution of southern Christians inside Juba. Thousands of southern Sudanese, including government officials, flee the capital.(97) In September, an urgent message is sent to Khartoum to send food at once.

6-11/1997: Katigiri—UN/WFP provides emergency relief to thousands of desperately hungry arriving from Juba and Uganda. (98)

7/1997: Aswa—The very old and very young in ethnic Acholi villages are found to be in desperate need of food aid. There is a dangerously high level of malnutrition in the Aswa region, and scores of severely malnourished are treated at Nimule hospital.(99)

7/1997: Juba—Travelers reports a food shortage in the civilian sector with some residents eating "four meals a week."(100) North of Juba, in a region where the government forcibly settled civilians in "Peace Villages," malnutrition is "prevalent among the population."(101)

7/1997: Ezo—Hundreds die as CARE reports a "surging" sleeping sickness epidemic" in Tambura county. (It is perhaps the worst such epidemic documented in the 20th century.) The parasitic malady infects "at least one in five people in Tambura county," and offers a "case study of the way disease follows war in Africa." Without treatment, it was predicted that 3,000 of 8,000 villagers would die in Ezo region alone.(102)

10/1997: Juba—By October, children are too hungry to attend classes. For many, "death by starvation was imminent."(103) "The situation is desperate. People say there is no point dying in Juba when one can survive on wild fruits or edible green leaves in the countryside." The Sudan Council of Churches reports that a majority of children "born in the main southern town" die under the age of five; malaria accounts for 28 percent of all deaths in Juba.


10/1997: Kagawada, Kalipapa, Lugware, Wonduraba—Villages in Juba county report serious malnutrition among the displaced, many of whom have fled from Juba city.(104)

11/1997: Terekeka—Drought is widespread; Ethnic Mundri begin the forced sale of cattle to obtain food.

12/1997: Juba—UN officials reported that 162,000 displaced people and refugees require full rations. In all, 36,000 displaced people, many malnourished, made their way to Juba in 1997. Observers noted that hunger was widespread among the displaced people, with food prices out of reach of most. Sudan government forces are resupplied by airlifts and barges.(105)
C-15 • Total War: Upper Nile in 1997


1/1997: Upper Nile-Juba Corridor — In January, the government halts the barging of nearly 4,000 tons of food aid to government-controlled towns—Akobo, Tonga, Melut, Sobat, and Juba—because of growing insecurity. OLS reports that there are 420,000 "very vulnerable" people located along the "Juba Corridor."(106)

2/1997: Pibor, Pochalla — Population throughout the region faces an "acute food shortfall."(107)

5/1997: Jonglei and Upper Nile — No food deliveries could be carried out, although a UN/WFP team in North Bor was prepared to deliver food to 15,000 beneficiaries. MSF-Belgium at Akobo, and MSF-Holland in Leer and Duar report widespread malnutrition. OLS provides supplementary food to MEDAIR, Comitato Collaborazione Medica (CCM), and MSF-Holland for patients in Billing, Langken, Atar, Duar, and Leer.

5/1997: Tonga, Fanjak — Due to government delays, the UN/WFP decides to cancel the movement of barges from Kosti to Juba. Barges loaded with 3,960 tons of food aid to regions requiring immediate assistance in Upper Nile. Pending government clearance, the balance would be distributed at Tonga and Fanjak.

7/1997: Warap, Lirna, Makoj, Tshwai, Tali — Riak Machar announces that the SSIA recaptured five villages from the SPLA. Scores of civilians are killed and wounded. The SPLA denies the capture of Warap but admits widespread damage and extensive civilian casualties.

7/1997: Ayod, Akobo — SSIM forces loot a NGO compound. Local depredations cause scores of casualties. SSIM forces also occupy and loot a Mercy Corps International (MCI)/ACROSS health project in Akobo, forcing the suspension of the project.

10/1997: Mading — The International Rescue Committee reported a significant influx of returnees. Food aid was urgently needed, and returnees reported numerous deaths were numbered during the return. (108)

11/1997: Lugwara, Wonderuba — Some 13,500 displaced people, many who had fled Juba in search of food, congregate in eastern Yei. Serious malnutrition is noted, with as many as 500 children moderately to seriously malnourished.(109)

C-16 • Total War: 1998 Overview

Beginning in 1998, both Upper Nile and eastern Equatoria faced severe food shortages as drought and insecurity created region-wide problems. As was usual, the needy were counted in the hundreds of thousands. And not only was there an urgent need for food in 1998, but UN/WFP warned that by mid-1999 1.6 million Sudanese would be "suffering from hunger."(110)

In April, a UN/WFP barge convoy moved 2,000 tons of food for 34 needy villages comprising some 377,000 people located from Malakal to Juba. In addition, 1,100 tons were to be dropped off in Juba to feed 120,000 displaced. In Upper Nile, the UN/WFP planned to send food barges up the Sobat, Zeraf, and Bentiu River "corridors."(111)
The following month, Sudanese Islamist and political leader Hassan al-Turabi argued that despite an incipient famine of catastrophic proportions, especially in Bahr al-Ghazal, it was still "more important to find an end to the country's civil war than to carry out relief operations in the famine-racked south." As he put it: "The real humanitarian aid for the people affected by the war in south Sudan is to bolster efforts for ending the war and achieving peace." The intransigent Islamist and "religious power behind Sudan's ruling junta" added that the "Emphasis on humanitarian assistance is useless so long as there are foreign circles that fan the war and hinder the peace efforts," said Turabi, who is considered the religious power behind Sudan's ruling junta.(112)

As the famine worsened, the UN was criticized because its own 1997 needs assessment was "not acted upon expeditiously and capably."(113) In mid-1998, the Committee on International Relations, in the U.S. House of Representatives, had argued that U.S. policy was "vague and confused" in light of the National Islamic Front (NIF) campaign of terror and destruction" in southern Sudan, and suggested the naming of a Special Envoy for Sudan. Importantly, the Committee requested consideration of "providing food, medical, and other non-lethal assistance directly to insurgent groups fighting the NIF regime."(114)

C-17 • Total War: Equatoria in 1998

Serious crop failures and insect infestations throughout 1997 had their impact in 1998. The massive influx of refugees from Uganda and Kenya had increased food shortages, and when food aid to Juba was limited, thousands of starving people left the city in search of food. Within Juba itself, hunger and starvation were common, and the salaries of government workers were up to six months in arrears. The OLS program, which was already behind schedule in May, was further affected when heavy rains frustrated the movement of food supplies.

1-3/1998: **Yei** — Hundreds of dead bodies are found and buried as people return to Yei and nearby villages. For months following the SPLA capture of Yei, returnees find it almost impossible to cultivate the land surrounding the town because of "landmines and anti-personnel mines which are planted around the town." (115)

1-4/1998: **Loka West/Lanya Payam** — Hunger and disease are widespread at this settlement located 37 miles west of Yei. More than 20,000 desperate people from displaced persons camps at Bamburey, Kirwa, and Mangalatora in Kajo-Keli survive without INGO support. The condition of displaced people in Lanya, Loka West, Kenyi, Limbe, Tali, Tindilo, Katigiri, and Wonduruba is very bad, with many cases of starvation deaths reported: "Those who are alive cannot bury the dead because they are too weak," David Feltcher, UN/WFP southern-sector coordinator for Sudan, notes: "The human suffering cannot be changed overnight, but we hope that with more food, we can stem the magnitude of the tragedy... With every day that passes, more lives are at risk."

2/1998: **Maridi** — Government imposes food aid flight ban for Maridi, Yei, Mundri, Ikotos. Urban residents in Juba and Yei flee to food surplus sites in western Equatoria or to refugee camps in Uganda.(116)

3/1998: **Katigiri** — Infant diarrhoea and malaria are common in the area, causing the deaths of scores of people.
3/1998: Tali Post — Some 33 people died of hunger in February and March at Tindilo Village alone. Neither Tali nor Tindilo had received emergency food aid since their capture by the SPLA in July 1997. International Aid Sweden finds the mortality rate especially high among children aged 2 to 5 years.

4-5/1998: Chukudum — A pro-SPLA journal reported that in April and May the famine in the South "was more widespread" than previously supposed, and "even the SPLA heartland of eastern Equatoria was ravaged by a devastating famine." Chukudum and other fertile areas of south-eastern Equatoria were "not usually prone to food shortages"; nonetheless, the people of Chukudum were "reduced to skeletal figures" as a result of air attacks and the disengagement of the SRRA, the SPLA's "very inept and inefficient humanitarian wing." (117)

4/1998: Torit, Boma — 20,000 needy reported in Boma. Thousands of hungry return to Kenya in search of food. Ominously, the lack of food has "increased tensions amongst the various clans." (118)

5/1998: Tali — 39,000 displaced persons who have received no food aid suffer acute hunger; many go to the bush in search of food.


5/1998: Juba — Starvation conditions persist as people wait for a food aid barge to arrive.

5/1998: Mundri County — Kediba, Minga, Magyeri villages are without food.

6-7/1998: Torit County — Some 100,000 people require food assistance. The arrival of food aid in July helps alleviate the most critical conditions.

C-18 • Total War: Upper Nile in 1998

Upper Nile suffered from two major tragedies in 1998: the collapse of military arrangements between competing Nuer militias supported by Khartoum, and a major flood. Military rivalries caused thousands of deaths and displaced tens of thousands. The flood, which affected Nile villages from the Egyptian frontier to Juba, was the worst in more than a decade and also displaced tens of thousands.


6/1998: Koch, Wicok, Ganyiel — A UN/WFP food distribution assists tens of thousands of needy, many from Bahr al-Ghazal. (120)

6-7/1998: Leer, Western Upper Nile — More than 750 malnourished children were "left without food after fighting between rebels and government troops forced aid workers to evacuate Leer in western Upper Nile province." (121) In late June, there was widespread fighting, and buildings were burned in Leer and aid agency compounds looted. The exodus halts the kala-azar, tuberculosis, and mobile clinic programs, and truncates "food distribution for 30,000 people." (122)

6/1998: Bor — Flooding in North Bor causes widespread damage.

6/1998: Western Upper Nile — Increasing malnutrition figures indicate that "either the amount of food distributed, the regularity of food distribution, or both factors are constraining the efficacy of the humanitarian intervention." (123)

7/1998: Boinj District — Many villages are hit, and civilian casualties reported in fighting between the SSDF of Riak Machar and the SPLA in eastern Upper Nile.(124)

7/1998: Panyagor — MSF reports that given "food and security reasons," much of their 80,000 target population "resides in the swamps."(125)

7/1998: Akobo, Wanding — MSF initiates an outreach program to a target population of 100,000, "many of whom have suffered severely from fighting."(126)

7/1998: Leer — The Khartoum daily Al-Anbaa reports that fighting in Upper Nile between the pro-government factions of Riak Machar and rival Paulino Matep have killed a "huge number" of soldiers and civilians; fighting displaces "over 70,000 civilians, mostly women, children, and the elderly." Fierce fighting occurs in Leer, and "about 250 houses, 50 shops, and 2,500 cattle compounds were destroyed." MSF reports "a growing nutritional crisis, similar to that in Bahr al-Ghazal."(127)

7/1998: Nhialdiu District — 180 deaths from hepatitis, and 106 from dysentery reported. Urgent need for health programs, but INGOs have been forced from region due to insecurity.(128)


8-9/1998: Bor — Initial reports indicate more than 160,000 have fled their villages in advance of flooding. Later reports located more than 8,000 destitute households (about 60,000 people) affected by Nile River floods, with the "flat area of Bor" the area "worst hit." Emergency food aid is urgently required. (129)
Footnotes for Section IV, Part C, "Total War in Southern Sudan"


(7) Ibid.


(12) Letter, Dr. Richard K. Mulla [former SSIM Secretary for Political Affairs], to Dr. Riek Machar Teny, Nairobi, Kenya, May 5, 1995.


(20) U.S. Embassy Cable 6761, Nairobi, Kenya, April 1994.

(21) Ibid.


(68) FEWS, Sudan Bulletin, FAX, Nairobi, February 1996.
(69) Ibid., September 1996.
(72) FEWS, Sudan Bulletin, FAX, Nairobi, December 1996.
(75) "Background Paper on Sudan," DHA/Interaction Meeting, August 9, 1996.
(83) FEWS Bulletin, FAX, Nairobi, November 1996.


Personal correspondence, in the author's possession.


Ibid., February 1997.


Ibid.


D. GENOCIDE IN BAHR AL-GHAZAL


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"The South is completely destroyed."
— Dr. Justin Yaac Arop, SPLM, quoted by Linda Slobodian, The Toronto Sun, 1998

The Dinka, the most populous ethnic group in southern Sudan, comprised more than 2 million people when the NSRCC came to power in June 1989. The military junta immediately enlisted the Rizayqat Arab militia of South Darfur and the Missiriya militia of South Kordofan in its war on the Nuba Mountains people of Kordofan and the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. The policy of using baggara (cattle nomad) tribal militias against the Dinka in the ongoing civil war was hardly a new tactic, but by 1998, after holding power for nearly a decade, there was little doubt that the Khartoum government's incessant effort to arm and direct the activity of Arab Murahileen formed part of an effort to extirpate the Dinka of northern Bahr al-Ghazal.

In 1994, the Sudan army introduced a new strategy: The Murahileen were joined by Nuer militias under the command of Riak Machar and manipulated by Khartoum, by indigenous Peoples Defense Forces (PDF) antagonistic to the Dinka, and by the so-called Gogrial-Aweil-Nyamlell-Tonj-Rumbek-Yirol (GANTRY) movement of Dinka renegade Kerubino Kwanjin Bol. All elements benefitted from Sudan army logistical and military support. The resulting attack on civilian populations was nothing less than criminal, and the government's overarching policy in Bahr al-Ghazal was nothing short of cultural genocide.(1)

In January 1994, President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir announced that the number of states comprising the Sudan would be increased to 25, the former province of Bahr al-Ghazal was divided into the states of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, and Lakes. Generally, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, with its capital at Raja, escaped most of the depredations that were to occur in hundreds of Dinka villages during the period 1994-1998.

Despite efforts to warn that drought conditions in 1993 would inevitably lead to food shortages in northern Bahr al-Ghazal, the OLS office in Khartoum soon realized that the international donor community was not responding to funding and food aid request as it had in the
past. The Khartoum government's efforts to reduce the INGO presence in Sudan, its unwillingness to create a grain reserves to respond to famine conditions in Sudan, and its insulting treatment of OLS officers all served to enhance "donor burnout."

Regionally, the civilian population of Bahr al-Ghazal was almost totally neglected by Khartoum, although many signs existed that a famine was coming. In March 1993, World Vision had reported that its nutritional survey of Bahr al-Ghazal children indicated "levels of acute malnutrition to be around 7 percent and moderate at 18-25 percent." By 1994, it was reported that there were already serious food shortages throughout the province "only a few months after the normal harvest cycle."(2)

Despite such warnings, the Sudan army attack continued on a number of fronts while the Khartoum government showed little interest in the region's civilian population or a food aid program for the needy in Bahr al-Ghazal. As 1994 began, the UN food inventory mounted at Lokichoggio, Kenya, because of a lack of air cargo carriers. Then, when cargo carriers were present, the Khartoum government impeded their use, denying in 1994 an average of four OLS flight requests a month access to areas under SPLA control; in 1995, the number increased to 10 a month, and in early 1996 the number increased to 12.

Despite government indifference, in 1994 OLS operated 7 relief stations in Bahr al-Ghazal. While they served the famine-stricken, they also served as a magnet to the hungry, who numbered in the tens of thousands. In May, a UN/WFP-sponsored train moving food supplies to the needy in Bahr al-Ghazal was looted as it passed through both SPLA and government-held regions. Given widespread hunger, the UN/WFP initiated airdrops near Aweil, Gogrial, Akon, Ariath, and Lietnhom. In September 1994, the UN/WFP sought to move 1,400 tons of food aid to "affected populations along the rail corridor," but the effort was delayed by government indifference. In October 1994, the USAID/Famine Early Warning System reported that in a broad sweep from Nyamlell to the west to Lietnhom in the east, 57,500 people required immediate food aid.(3)

Nevertheless, despite all efforts, only 45 percent of the OLS projected food needs for Bahr al-Ghazal reached the needy in 1994.

1/1994:  *Lietnhom, Mayen Abun* — An MSF/France nutritional survey reports a "general area global malnutrition rate of 12.4 percent, with malnutrition in Lietnhom of 23 percent." Famine conditions are especially bad at Mayen Abun, and airdrops are initiated.(4)

1/1994:  *Gogrial* — Nuer irregulars armed by the Khartoum government and commanded by Kerubino Kwanyin Bol begin to terrorize the Gogrial region of Bahr al-Ghazal. Hundreds of civilians are killed, villages burned, and thousands of women and children abducted and forced to move to the North. From 1994 through 1997, the Twic County area is "the main theater of the devastative Kerubino Forces' operations."(5) Those attacks cause SPLA reprisals, and the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal battle the Nuer throughout eastern Bahr al-Ghazal and western Upper Nile.

1/1994:  *Nyamlell* — The UN/WFP suspends its airdrops because Murahileen accompanying a military train moving south of the Bahr al-Arab River attack scores of Dinka villages near the railway. Hundreds of civilians are killed and thousands scatter to the bush.
2/1994: **Aweil East** — Scores of villages (Malek, Malou, Gok, etc.) are attacked by PDF and Murahileen raiders in one of Bahr al-Ghazal's most heavily populated regions (estimated 280,000 people). Hundreds are killed, thousands are displaced.


3/1994: **Akon** — MSF calls Akon a "famine stricken region" that has been "cut off from the outside world for years."(6)


6-9/1994: **Wau** — As displaced move to Wau, more than 100 deaths are reported in Wau displaced persons camps.

7-12/1994: **Turalei** — Kerubino's forces pillage the surrounding area. Many deaths reported.

8/1994: **Thiek Thou** — Kerubino forces attack and force INGOs to evacuate.

8/1994: **Mankien** — In late August, an emergency airlift brings food to 5,000 starving displaced.

8/1994: **Maper, Akak** — During OLS visits, a very high incidence of infant malnutrition is noted.

9/1994: **Ajeip** — Floods affect the regional harvest, especially around Magi and Mayen Abun. Reports indicate that village food supplies will last only two months.

9/1994: **Nyamlell** — Flooding creates food scarcity. Thousands of Dinka from the Nyamlell, Marial Bai, Majak Bai region move to the North. Nearly 25,000 displaced Dinka congregate at Meiram, South Kordofan.

9/1994: **Warrup, Rumbek** — Both towns are nearly deserted, and given an absence of medicines OLS finds "an alarming health situation."

9/1994: **Mayen Abun, Akak** — Fighting throughout the region creates thousands of internally displaced and forces UN/WFP staff to be removed from Akak.

10/1994: **Akot** — As many as 400 civilians are killed by government-backed Nuer militia based in Ganyliel. 35,000 villagers flee to the bush.


11/1994: **Akon, Panthou, Nyamlell** — Many attacks occur. The area north of Malualkon suffers greatly. Deaths are many, but fewer than previously reported.(7)


12/1994: **Akon** — SPLA-controlled village is bombed.

12/1994: **Thiek Thou** — Nuer militia attack three nearby villages. Sudan government/militia raid villages far from the Jur River; scores of villagers are killed and hundreds of children captured.

12/1994: **Gogrial/Akon/Mayen Abun** corridor — After weeks of fighting, thousands of hungry southerners move north SPLA-held Akon or toward Abyei in southern Kordofan. In December, the government allows the UN/WFP to airlift emergency food supplies to only two sites in Bahr al-Ghazal.(8)

12/1994: **Maker, Ariath, Wathok** — A government train bound for Wau transports Murahileen across the Bahr al-Arab. They begin their attacks at Maker, north of Aweil, and proceed southward "looting, pillaging, and raping as they passed through."(9)

12/1994: **Namyell** — Murahileen depredations are reported west of the railroad from Nyamlell to the south.

65
Bahr al-Ghazal: Creating Thousands of Displaced in 1995

While the forced movement of thousands of internally displaced from Wau city to camps created outside the capital at Marial Ajith, Mounor, and east of the Jur River dates from April 1992, the displacement of whole communities in Bahr al-Ghazal is dated from 1994.

In February 1995, it was obvious to observers that the GANTRY attacks were meant to produce famine among the Dinka. Localized food shortages were already noted, as was the fact that the Sudan army, its PDF, militias, and even the GANTRY were better armed than ever before.(10) When the SPLA was slow to meet the numerous attacks, thousands of southerners began to trek toward the North in a mass movement last seen in early 1989. Thousands of destitute displaced congregated at Abyei, South Kordofan.(11)

Throughout 1995, the Nuer forces antagonistic to the SPLA were especially active in the Lakes region. Riak's forces, which at their apogee controlled about one-third of the South, were sent from Bentiu and Leer to attack Pagarau and cause widespread havoc. Their cattle rustling created numerous problems between previously pacific Nuer and Dinka villages. Once the Nuer began to attack Dinka pastoralists in the Tonj and Akop regions, the SPLA began to arm Dinka herders.(12)

After being stranded for months at Babanusa, South Kordofan, a military train carrying some food aid for Aweil and Wau crossed the Bahr al-Arab River in February 1995. Once again, scores of villages were attacked, hundreds were killed, and women and children were taken to the North. Murahileen attacks caused thousands of Dinka to flee toward Upper Nile where more than 5,000 starving people were reported at Pagak and Mading in a food deficit region.

Through the first half of 1995, the SSIA forces of Riak Machar caused widespread damage and the deaths of hundreds if not thousands of Dinka. In August, raiders, reportedly SPLA from Bahr al-Ghazal, attacked a Nuer settlement protected by Riak's SSIA forces in the Ganyliel area of Upper Nile province. Nearly 200 villagers were slaughtered and 50 wounded in what was called an SPLA reprisal to avenge the death and destruction in eastern Bahr al-Ghazal; the SPLA later denied any responsibility and blamed the attack on armed cattle raiders.(13)

In May 1995, the Camboni missionaries active in Rumbek region reported that "returnees" had become a problem. Beginning in 1994, thousands of displaced persons at Khartoum had applied to return to their place of origin in the South, and the Khartoum government, which sought to rid the capital region of as many southern displaced persons as possible, used various aid to transport the displaced to Wau. In 1995, thousands of displaced persons were transported to Wau, but the effort was little short of catastrophic because the returnees found that there was little food in Wau and what food there was they could not afford. Thousands turned to the bush for food, and many died before relief aid reached them. The situation in Bahr al-Ghazal itself was not helped by the total ban on food aid flights that the government imposed in September 1995.

In November 1995, Baroness Cox of Christian Solidarity International traveled to southern Sudan, and during her unauthorized tour d'horizon she "witnessed the effects of the policy of no-go [no food airlifts] areas in places as far apart as Pariang, Marial, and Mayen Abun in Bahr al-Ghazal to Loronyo in eastern Equatoria. People in their hundreds were dying around us of starvation and disease....we often found ghost villages whose inhabitants had died of starvation. Others were dying in front of our eyes."(14)
Late in the year, the FAO indicated that the 1995 food crop was very poor and was "estimated to cover less than half of the consumption requirements in the southern Sudan." Sorghum prices in Wau were reported five times higher than they were "in the surplus area of Renk." It was an indication of tough times to come in the capital of Bahr al-Ghazal.(15)

At year's end, the UN/WFP reported that due to government prohibitions and the constant raiding by Murahileen and Kerubino's militia, only 19 percent of the food aid that had been projected for 1995 had actually reached Bahr al-Ghazal—compared to the 45 percent of OLS projected food needs that reached the region in 1994.

1-2/1995: Lietnhom, Malualkon, Turalei — GANTRY attacks and villages are burned to the ground, food stores looted and cattle stolen, "leaving thousands destitute."(16)

1-2/1995: Nyamlell — PDF raids heavily populated region located 10-15 miles north of Nyamlell. Scores are killed and hundreds captured at Wotar Wol, Wud Arul, and other villages.(17)

3/1995: Nyamlell — More than 100 deaths and more than 200 children are kidnapped following a devastating Sudan government -Murahileen-PDF attack. NGO and UN operations are shut down. Shortly afterward, CSI reports that Nyamlell town itself "has had at least 1,000 people sold into slavery during the last five years."(18)

3/1995: Akon. Lietnhom, Malualkon, Turalei — A "humanitarian emergency is feared in northern Bahr al-Ghazal," where government forces and Murahileen have carried out widespread destruction of crops and food stores. OLS urges the immediate reopening of its Akon site. Akon is then bombed. There is "widespread destruction" around Lietnhom, where "most people" are displaced and the situation is described as "bleak". At Malualkon and Turalei, the "complete destruction of households and crops" is reported.(19)

4/1995: General — More than 25 Dinka from Bahr al-Ghazal who had been taken to the North and held at Meiram, South Kordofan, are killed in a reprisal attack following a fire at a local market.

4/1995: Panacier — Widespread destruction results from SSIM attacks on the SPLA-held region between Gogrial and Panacier. Many villages are attacked and hundreds of civilians are abducted by militia troops accompanying the military train from Babanusa. Some 8,000 civilians are "made homeless" near Panacier.(20)

4/1995: Chelcou — A notably rich grazing ground in Aweil West region is ravaged.

4-5/1995: Gogrial districts — South of Gogrial, the militia kill many villagers at Kuajok, Karic, and Manyok. More than 500 women and 150 children over age five are abducted.

5/1995: Akon, Lietnhom, Mayen Abun — Despite numerous raids and the generation of thousands of needy, the Khartoum government bars UN relief flights. And in further violation of agreements signed with the UN, in July, the government bans the use of C-130 "for transport of relief supplies."(21)

5/1995: Akon, Lietnhom, Malualkon, Nyamlell — All suffer from Sudan government attacks and Murahileen raids. Compounds at Nyamlell are "looted and burned."

5/1995: Aweil, Malankon — After villages are attacked by Murahileen,21,000 displaced persons congregate at Mankien, Mayen Abun, Turalei, Mongal, and Bar. Hundreds are killed. Thousands flee toward Upper Nile.(22)

5/1995: Panthou, Panliet, Mapel — Villages are burned and left without food supplies.

5/1995: Wau-Gogrial — Camboni missionaries report that "returnees" who crossed the Busseri River were surviving in the bush with practically no food or shelter.
Missionaries in Gogrial urged that the return, which was not directly organized by
the government but received its permission, had to be stopped or it would "turn the
south into a burial ground."(23)

5/1995:  
**Gogrial, Mayen Abun, Lietnhom** — Militias accompanying a military train raid
north of Wau and torch "many villages in Gogrial District." More thousands are
displaced in the region, many in the area of Mayen Abun and Lietnhom.(24)

6/1995:  
**Ajiep, Panthou** — Village is burned by militia. Some deaths. With substantial
militia activity north of Wau, relief workers are evacuated for a time from
Panthou.(25)

6/1995:  
**Railroad Route** — The voyage by train to and from Wau takes more than three
months and, throughout, the voyage is punctuated by deadly Murahileen raids on
villages within a day's horse ride from the railroad.(26) The "Slave Train" returns
to the North with its wagons crammed with captured women and children.

7/1995:  
**Gogrial** — Panliet village is leveled by GANTRY. Food stocks are looted.

9/1995:  
**Yirol** — Reports of many starvation deaths in villages southeast of Rumbek leads
the government to announce it will investigate conditions in Yirol district.(27) It
does not.

9/1995:  
**Panthou** — Scores are killed or captured in a GANTRY raid.

10/1995:  
**Gogrial** — Fighting in the vicinity "has left entire villages burned and looted."
Crops are abandoned, and thousands of hungry displaced move toward Thiet and
Nabagok.(28)

11-12/1995:  
**Train Route** — Scores are killed and captured as a military train returns from Wau
to the North.

12/1995:  
**Lietnhom** — Militia attacks leave numerous dead.

12/1995:  
**Tonj** — World Vision reports that in its area of operations, "100,000 beneficiaries"
received emergency food aid. (29)

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**D-4 • Bahr al-Ghazal: Generating Greater Displacement in 1996**

In January 1996, a UNICEF report noted "great concern on all fronts for the people in the
turbulent regions," especially those in northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Widespread fighting had
prevented a thorough OLS "harvest assessment," but despite projected food shortages, Khartoum
government ministers argued that the food supply in southern Sudan was "good with production
covering 53 percent of the region's needs."(30) The OLS office thought differently, and UNICEF
expressed its "great concern" with regard to food availability in northern Bahr al-Ghazal. It
reported that in some areas "militia raids reportedly destroyed up to 75 percent of people's grain
stores," and access to health care services "dropped from 36 percent to 4 percent of the
population."(31) Two months into the year, the OLS office reported that throughout southern
Sudan food security was "mixed"; however, region-wide, some of the most needy were located in
northern Bahr al-Ghazal.(32)

Eastern Bahr al-Ghazal benefitted somewhat by interfactional fighting between various
Upper Nile militias, but by mid-year, that circumstance ended, and Riak Machar's Nuer and the
Anyana II began to attack Dinka villages in western Upper Nile and eastern Bahr al-Ghazal. It had
been predicted that there would be "more deaths from interfactional fighting than from the
SPLA-GOS conflict," but that prediction proved too optimistic by far.(33)
In July, a UN/WFP spokesman reported that "the ban on flights which had begun in September 1995" had caused a "critical" situation. Some 500,000 people were already "seriously hungry" and villagers had "exhausted their food supply." They were awaiting "a harvest that is in any case likely to fall short of their needs." The WFP had reached only 22 percent of "the intended target of food deliveries," and it was reported that "children are showing signs of malnutrition" and diseases were "spreading among a weakened population." It was feared that the famine would be devastating in the traditional June-August "hunger gap" period.(34)

In response to the halt in food aid assistance and warnings of an impending famine, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed his concern with Khartoum's "unilateral and unjustified obstruction" of humanitarian aid. Its intransigence was blocking food movements to 700,000 people affected by food shortages in southern Sudan.(35) After the Secretary General expressed his distress that since September 1995 the NIF government had blocked OLS use of C-130 cargo aircraft, the government soon agreed to resume relief flights. Nevertheless, once relief flights were resumed from Lokichoggio, there followed an increase in the number of militia attacks on villages located in northern Bahr al-Ghazal, and famine conditions were exacerbated.

As if 1996 weren't bad enough, the OLS office predicted that in 1997 one half "the 4.6 million population of southern Sudan" would be confronted by "a localized cereal deficit."(36) And northern Bahr al-Ghazal was considered the region that would be most threatened by food shortages.

1/1996: Akon — Central Bahr al-Ghazal, thought to be under SPLA control, is overrun by forces of Kerubino Kwanyin Bol. Thousands flee toward Akon and the North. The SPLA then denies all OLS food aid flights to villages occupied by Kerubino's militia.

1/1996: Rum Marial — PDF forces accompanied by Sudan government forces attack villages. Scores killed.

2/1996: GnoK Dinka region — The PDF and militias attack ethnic GnoK Dinka in villages located south of the Kiir (Bahr al-Arab) River. Scores are killed. Thousands take to the bush and flee toward Turalei.(37)

2/1996: Gogrial — OLS reports widespread hunger throughout a vast area "where military have burned houses and looted food stores."(38)

2/1996: Akot — The large region from Akot to Ngap (25 miles to the southeast) and from Adior to Gutthom (15 miles to the south) encloses a potentially dangerous food deficit area. Famine is already noted in masses of people on the move.

2/1996: Ariath, Nyamlell — Militia accompanying a military train attack Ariath and other villages north of the Lol River and then Nyamlell.

3-04/1996: Yirol, Tonj, Gogrial — Dinka cattle camps are raided by SSIM utilizing automatic and other modern weaponry. At least 90 civilians are killed and 33 abducted.(39)

4/1996: Gogrial — Forty deaths are reported in militia attacks on four villages.

4/1996: Nyamlell, Manyiel — Sudan government forces and Murahileen accompanying a train from Muglad to Wau attack villages in region. Ameth and Chelkou villages are devastated, as are other villages located within a day's ride of the railroad. Hundreds are killed. (40)

5/1996: General — Some 7,000 Dinka flee militia attacks and congregate at Abyei, southern Kordofan, where food is in very short supply.(41)

6/1996: Turalei — Twic Dinka at Abyei, South Kordofan are attacked by Murahileen. Scores are killed. The militia follows with an attack on Turalei, where they are
joined by the SSIM from the east, and by Kerubino and his irregulars from the south. Hundreds are killed. (42)

7/1996: **Panthou** — Following resumption of C-130 flights, the UN/WFP drops emergency food supplies to MSF-Belgium personnel, who after a long absence return to Panthou and Wathmuok.

7/1996: **Akak, Turalei** — *Action Contre la Faim* (ACF) resumes operations and reports widespread dangerous infant diarrhoeal disease. Targeted food distributions begin for 36,000 beneficiaries.

9/1996: **Gogrial region** — FEWS reports that a severe crisis is developing in northern Bahr al-Ghazal because of increased insecurity. Because of government and militia attacks in the region of Aweil East, Mualualkon, Alek, Panliet and Mayen, some 150,000 internally displaced have congregated at Akon. Retreating families were forced to leave crops in the field. Incipient famine conditions are noted among some populations arriving in Akon. (43)

10/1996: **Gogrial, Aweil regions** — Flooding causes serious crop losses and thousands move to Aweil and Gogrial in search of food.

10/1996: **Ariath, Maker** — Replicating the depredations of late 1994, on their return trip to north Murahileen accompanying the military supply train bound for Babanusa attack six villages located east of the railway. More than ten killed and abducted in one raid alone.


10/1996: **Thiek Thou** — Insecurity halts the OLS food aid program.

10-11/1996: **Akok** — Militia attacks in Twic county create 20,000 displaced. It is the fourth such attack in 1996.

11/1996: **Northern Bahr al-Ghazal** — An OLS/UNICEF nutrition assessment revealed an "acute" nutrition problem at Agaigai (14,000 people), Ajeip (21,000) Madhol (6,000) with unacceptably high malnutrition rates for children under five. Very high rates are found among children who had fled Lietnhom and Thiek Thou and who had recently crossed the Jur River. (44)

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**D-5 • Bahr al-Ghazal: Conditions Deteriorate Further in 1997**

In January 1997, an OLS/UNICEF "Report on the Nutritional Status of Women and Children in Southern Sudan, 1996" indicated very real problems of infant malnutrition in both Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. A few weeks later, the UN/WFP projected that one-third of the population in southern Sudan were "vulnerable," including 536,000 of 929,000 people in Bahr al-Ghazal.

Nevertheless, in March, the Khartoum government denied flights from Lokichoggio to 33 locations, including many sites in Bahr al-Ghazal. "The restrictions on OLS flights reduced food aid for more than 700,000 aid-dependent Sudanese and prevented the delivery of seeds and tools, affecting timely planting." (45) A USAID Famine Early Warning System bulletin warned in late July 1997 that drought would "severely affect crop yields in Rumbek and Yirol in Bahr al-Ghazal/Lakes."

Perhaps the most vulnerable region in all of Bahr al-Ghazal was Twic county. Before the war, it contained nearly 40 percent of the population found in Bahr al-Ghazal. In recent months, Turalei, its "capital," and Akak, its next largest town, had been leveled. After signing a peace pact
on April 21, 1997 with the Khartoum government, six south Sudanese factions opposed to John Garang and his SPLA merged into a single front and developed a "common agenda." Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, leader of the Bahr al-Ghazal group of the so-called Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA-BGG) agreed to the creation of a military alliance—the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) under the leadership of Riek Machar, the chairman of the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM).(46) Following this agreement, no Dinka village in northern and eastern Bahr al-Ghazal was safe from pillaging. Continuous fighting in the northern sector led thousands of displaced to move to Abyei. In July, however, the SPLA was so active in South Kordofan that INGOs had to evacuate Abyei.

In Twic county alone, there were some 150,000 internally displaced people and it was reported that they and an additional 160,000 returnees from the north were competing for food aid supplied by UN/WFP airdrops. More than 60 percent of the farm families were unable to grow crops in 1997 due to constant fighting during the first six months of the year. Cattle, an elemental source of nutrition, had been killed off or rustled. Starvation and disease—especially infant diarrhoea and malaria—were endemic, and there was no medical clinic operating in Twic county. Thus, by year end, the estimated malnutrition rate was "greater than 50 percent in Twic" and about the same in nearby Gogrial and Abyei counties.(47)

In August, an FAO spokesman in Nairobi indicated that "the overall food outlook in Sudan for 1997 has so far been generally satisfactory" but argued that in the South "some 2.6 million war-affected and displaced persons would need emergency food aid estimated at 52,176 tons."(48)

By October, the UN/WFP and FAO had confirmed serious food shortages in southern Sudan, and Operation Lifeline Sudan participants initiated a funding appeal that would last through the coming months. (In 1997 donors would give $45 million.) The OLS office also appealed to the Khartoum government, without much success, for better access to food deficit regions in southern Sudan.(49)

1-12/1987: Wau — "Militia and government attacks on Dinka [living] inside Wau cost several hundred lives."(50)
1-12/1997: Twic County — With an estimated population of 760,000 (of an estimated 2 million people in Bahr al-Ghazal) and 150,000 displaced, Twic County is especially important to OLS. Turalei and Akak towns and the surrounding area are overrun by some 150,000 displaced people and 160,000 returnees from the north. There was no medical clinic available. Due to militia raiding, more than 60 percent of the farm families could not grow crops in 1997, and cattle, an elemental source of nutrition, were killed and rustled. Starvation and disease—especially infant diarrhoea and malaria—went hand in hand, and by year's end, the estimated malnutrition rate was "greater than 50 percent in Twic, Gogrial, and Abyei counties." ("Bahr el Ghazal Region Emergency Medical Intervention Assistance Proposal," Norwegian People's Aid, Nairobi, 1998.)
3/1997: Twic County — Government halts all flights of food, medicine, and seed to a region where 20,000 displaced persons are in great need.
3-5/1997: Tonj — Many civilians killed in vicious fighting that accompanied the SPLA capture of Tonj, 60 miles south of Wau.(51) Airdrops were to have begun in April, but were halted by a government ban on C-130 flights. One WVI health clinic at Ngabakok registers 300 severely malnourished children.(52) Infant malnutrition is widespread.
Wun Rog, Ajak — Fighting between the SPLA and Kerubino's SSDF forces creates numerous civilian casualties in the region located 70 miles north of Gogrial.(53)

Thiek Thou — Following a joint UN/WFP and MSF-Belgium assessment, significant malnutrition was reported in Bahr al-Ghazal. With a large displaced population and high incidence of infant malnutrition, the region was considered a priority supplementary feeding site. WFP delivered some 103 tons of food and UNICEF-purchased high protein biscuits, but in late April insecurity halted relief interventions.

Akot, Madhol — Nine bombs dropped on Akot preclude use of nearby airstrip where many displaced people congregated. At Madhol, the UN/WFP provides food aid for nearly 14,000 beneficiaries until C-130 flights are suspended.

Wau — Following a succession of Sudan government military defeats, Wau's 120,000 people are practically held captive. As few are allowed to leave the capital to cultivate land, food shortages are exacerbated. Food relief flights to Wau itself are halted from April through mid-May.

Rumbek, Tonj, Warrap — Many civilians are killed in the vicious fighting that accompanied the SPLA capture of Rumbek (on May 1), Tonj (100 kilometers south of Wau, on May 9), and Warrap (on May 20). ("Rebels seize town in southern Sudan," Nairobi, May 10, 1997, AFP; "South Sudan Bulletin: Solidarity Freedom & Justice," Norwegian People's Aid, Nairobi, May 28, 1997)

Rumbek, Mayen Abun, Wunrok — The SPLA captures Rumbek town. The town itself is nearly flattened and devoid of food supplies. As people return, the Camboni Fathers worry that "lack of immediate concern could degenerate easily into severe hunger, famine, and some epidemic." Starvation deaths are reported in the area of Mayen Abun. At Wunrok, east of Akon, the SPLA overruns Kerubino's SSDF headquarters. More thousands are displaced.(54)

Nyamlell, Majak Bai — Local residents report more than 100 militia attacks in the region surrounding Nyamlell. Majak Bai village is attacked by militia. Nearly 70 people are abducted.

Yirol — The major town in Lakes falls to the SPLA. The only civilians found there are the dead and dying.

Twic County — An estimated 75,000 displaced persons are created in Twic as fighting intensifies. In June, one study finds 62 percent global malnutrition in Twic.

Tonj — Some 55,000 displaced persons are reported in Tonj. SARRA and NGOs report that 55,000 people at Tonj and elsewhere in Lakes are "in desperate need of relief food."(55)

Gogrial — Nuer militia attacks the homeland of the Apuk Dinka. Lietnhom is overrun again and many cattle are lost.

Rumbek — People congregating in town are "desperate"; and "in dire need of shelter." They have yet to receive humanitarian assistance from the international aid community.

Aweil to Wau — Sixty percent of the village population found along the railway line were displaced absolutely disrupting crop cultivation and harvest. Many displaced move toward Wau and Gogrial counties, where there is a shortage of food. Near Rumbuk, about 5,000 displaced are considered very vulnerable.

Turalei — Kerubino Kwayin Bol's troops "blazed a trail of destruction" in the region around Turalei. As a result, "The population is only a quarter of its former size. Those left subsist on wild leaves and grass seed because their livestock was
rustled, and crops could not be planted.... "The area is devastated. So many people died, from hunger and from the killing."(56)

10/1997: General — SPLA officials complain that the government has refused aircraft landing rights to the SPLA-controlled towns of Rumbek, Tonj, and Yirol. OLS, in a report made available to IPS, indicated it had failed to receive flight clearance for the towns of Ajiep, Akak, Thiekthon, Akon, Wunrok, Mayen Abun, Warrap, Panyagor, and Yiomcir.(57)

10/1997: Wau — Following an SPLA mortar attack, civilians are practically prohibited to leave. "Moderate" malnutrition is soon reported in the capital.(58) A military train arrives, but food scarcity persists in the civilian sector.


12/1997: Wau — There are 15,000 hungry displaced people located at camps inside the city and 15,000 barely survive in other locations in the city. The regional hospital has practically ceased to function and is considered a death trap.

D-6 · Bahr al-Ghazal: Fighting, Famine, and Flood in 1998

In January 1998, Bahr al-Ghazal was a disaster waiting to happen. The OLS Annual Assessment for 1997 noted that Thiet County was in terrible condition and declared it an OLS priority area. Indeed, the new year began badly, with an estimated 50,000 starving Dinka reportedly making their way toward Wau. Hunger was everywhere, and as was common when famine conditions persisted, dangerous diarrhoeal diseases were spreading among children on the move.

In January, USAID/FEWS reported that at least 915,000 people in southern Sudan would require food aid and that 30,000 tons of food would be required to provide the needy until the next harvest. Northern Bahr al-Ghazal was a "continuing area of concern," but FEWS noted that "no contingency plans are in place for Bahr al-Ghazal" despite the fact that "local people are reported to be comparing this year to 1988"—a horrific famine year that led to the creation of OLS.(59)

Despite the misery that existed everywhere in Bahr al-Ghazal in early 1998, the Khartoum government incited the nomadic Rizayqat Arabs of Darfur and their baggara counterparts, the Misiriya of South Kordofan, to attack the Dinka settlements in northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Ostensibly, the Murahileen raids were an integral aspect of a "strategic campaign" to quash SPLA support in the Bahr al-Jabal/Lol River region and "secure the oil fields around Bentiu, the capital of Unity State." With each attack, more and more Dinka made their way toward Wau, and those with cattle undertook what became a region-wide slaughter of animals to cope with existing food shortages. By late January, Wau was already overwhelmed by new arrivals, and the Social Affairs Minister admitted that "the health situation is beyond our capabilities."

1/1998: Marial Bai — Thousands of displaced congregated ten miles from Wau. Hundreds already showed signs of malnutrition, and the displaced persons survived with little food and no shelter.(60) The UN estimated that 240,000 people "were vulnerable" and would need food aid.(61)

1/1998: Tonj, Gogrial — World Vision reports that a "sudden" attack by government forces causes tens of thousands of war-displaced. Thousands of women and children
appear at feeding centers in Tonj and Gogrial "desperately in need of food, medicines, and shelter."(62)

1-4/1998: Twic, Aweil, Abyei (Kordofan) — In January, insecurity forces Action Contre la Faim to evacuate from the Twic, Aweil, and Abyei counties, exacerbating "food insecurity" throughout the region. In April, an eyewitness account notes 17,000 displaced and "hungry men, women, and children" camped at Akuem, who had recently displaced by a joint PDF-Rizayqat militia raid in Aweil West county that "killed hundreds of people."(63)

Despite the numerous catastrophes to strike Bahr al-Ghazal, the Murahileen would continue on the offensive in northern Bahr al-Ghazal for more than six months. By May 1998, famine conditions were everywhere apparent in Bahr al-Ghazal. Nonetheless, the government continued to support a Murahileen campaign in Aweil, Gogrial, and Abyei counties. In northern Bahr al-Ghazal, INGO's relocated staff as Arab militias burned villages, looted food stores, and rustled cattle. Relief centers were special targets. Many local people were killed, and hundreds of women and children are captured and taken north.(64)

Deteriorating conditions throughout the region changed from bad to worse in late January 1998, when the SSDF forces of Kerubino Kuanyin Bol turned on their Khartoum mentors and attacked Sudan army positions in Wau. Coincident with the attempt to capture Wau, a second SSDF force commanded by Paul Matong Awan attacked Aweil, 90 miles to the north. The rebels entered the town but were unable to maintain their hold and soon retreated. In Wau, the SSDF seemed poised to take the city, but looting took precedence over military victory. The Sudan government forces counter-attacked and forced the SSDF from Wau and toward the south, where they merged with SPLA forces. After fleeing Aweil Awan's force moved north along the railroad and captured Ariath, 36 miles to the north. Still, the Sudan military and its allies were soon able to clear the rail line, and in February a reinforcement and supply train left Babanusa and began its slow journey toward Wau.

While Kerubino's forces were soon forced from Wau and Aweil, the attack itself set off a catastrophic chain of events. The Sudan government reacted almost immediately by suspending humanitarian flights to Bahr al-Ghazal on February 4. The ban itself affected almost half the population of southern Sudan and placed "the lives of vulnerable civilians at great risk."(65) In February, the UN/WFP was able to deliver only 840 tons of food by truck and plane to Bahr al-Ghazal, and using the FAO guideline for emergency rations, the tonnage could feed only 60,000 people for a month.

As the OLS office had estimated that 240,000 people "were already vulnerable" in Bahr al-Ghazal,(66) without the food aid flights famine was inevitable. Following the fighting, a bad situation was made worse when tens of thousands of Dinka living in Wau, Awil, and Abyei, Kordofan, fled to the bush, most with only the clothes on their backs. "Fearing government retribution," they sought refuge in "the only ethnically safe place for them, the rebel-controlled areas already predicted to be at risk for famine."(67)

In mid-February 1998, OLS NGOs warned that 100,000 lives were "at risk in southern Sudan."(68) Despite the budding calamity, in late February, the Khartoum government permitted the UN/WFP to airdrop and airlift food only by light plane and to only six locations. Then, as the "at risk" population continued to enlarge, the UN warned that the disaster would likely affect some four million people, and it appealed for $109 million from the international community.(69)
The New York Times soon reported that by curbing relief for at least 500,000 southerners the government was employing a "strategy of starvation" in Bahr al-Ghazal.(70) And it was only as a result of international pressure that the Khartoum government finally agreed in late March to increase the number of sites serviced by OLS to 21; by then, it was reported that 350,000 people were facing starvation.(71) In Nairobi, the UN Regional Information Network reported that people had "resorted to sifting the earth in the hope of finding grains of wild rice." Seed was scarce, fishing was poor, and water levels in rivers and pools were "low due to drought." Thus, to survive, more and more Dinka were forced to slaughter or sell their animals for food.(72)

In April, the UN/WFP warned that it was "barely meeting 30 percent of food needs in Bahr al-Ghazal" and the "people in dire need" had actually "soared beyond the 350,000 identified in February after heavy fighting erupted in Bahr-al Ghazal." It argued that unless it could greatly augment its food aid airlift, the Bahr al-Ghazal region would face a "catastrophe." Only days later, the WFP in Nairobi warned of a coming "catastrophic famine" in Bahr, and that the number in immediate need had increased beyond the 350,000 "identified in February"; indeed, the situation in Bahr al-Ghazal had reached "a critical and frightening level" with the "threat of thousands of people dying." However, only one C-130 was airlifting food from Lokichoggio, and the UN/WFP was meeting only 30 percent of emergency food needs in Bahr al-Ghazal—2,500 tons of food a month when 6,000 tons was needed. In late April, Khartoum finally approved use of another C-130 cargo aircraft, increasing heavy aircraft movement to 48 tons a day.(73)

May rains ended a long drought, but they seriously hampered the airlift and OLS reaction to the escalating famine in southern Sudan, which was centered in northern Bahr al-Ghazal. The "at risk" population was increased to 700,000.(74) Oxfam reported that there were 595,000 southern Sudanese at risk, but the number of people "requiring humanitarian food aid" had risen to 930,000.(75) A hurried OLS survey of children in nine villages then showed at least one in five severely malnourished. It was reported in July that in the previous 15 weeks the emergency food airlift had brought only 12,000 tons of food to Bahr al-Ghazal.

Murahileen attacks halted momentarily when the forces of Kerubino Kwanyin Bol attacked Baggara settlements, killing many and running off thousands of cattle stolen from the Dinka. However, within weeks, the Murahileen organized retaliatory raids on Dinka villages of northern Bahr al-Ghazal, and by early June 1998 the well-armed attackers "had burned many Dinka villages, captured hundreds of women and children as slaves, stolen many thousands of heads of cattle, and caused widespread devastation." When their attacks continued through July, more than 75,000 Dinka were uprooted.(76)

As the famine appeared to reach its summer apex, the Khartoum government agreed to a month's cease-fire. By then, aid officials admitted privately that the truce had "come too late" even though the UN/WFP was servicing 38 locations in Bahr al-Ghazal and operating the largest airlift in its history.(77) "A mass immigration" of Dinka from Rumbek, Yirol, and Tonj was "moving towards Western Equatoria." Hundreds of Dinka appeared at Mundri, Maridi, and Yambio "in search of food." Tragically, the Dinka were without cattle, and the "prevailing fear" in Equatoria was that if the SPLA did not act quickly, the local people would treat the Dinka "as invaders, leading to ethnic clashes."(78)

In August, OLS administrators estimated the relief effort would have to continue for another 18 months, and the UN/WFP warned that a "more serious famine is expected in 1999 than 1998 in southern Sudan."(79)
1/1998: Wau, Gogrial, Aweil — Fighting erupts in Wau in late January. An estimated 270,000 persons are displaced from Wau, Gogrial, and Aweil. (80) NPS claims that the expulsion of ACF from the Twic, Aweil, and Abyei counties "exacerbated food insecurity" in region.

2/1998: Wau — An estimated 100,000 people, nearly all Dinka, fled the fighting in Wau and Aweil and the vicious government reprisals that followed.

2/1998: Pathou, Ajiep, Liethom, Akuen, Lunyaker, Adet — Thousands of hungry and "exhausted" displaced congregate at Akuen (17,000), Ajiep (21,000), and Adet (13,000), where they believe relief food will be delivered. (81)


2-4/1998: Pakor — Some 14,000 needy congregate as a humanitarian aid crisis develops in Gogrial County. When the Sudan government promised to approve a food feeding center at Pakor, an estimated 70,000 starving and desperate people arrived from Aweil, Gogrial, and as far distant as Abyei in South Kordofan. "Some die on the way." By April, a crisis develops, complicated by "a dire shortage" of donor funds for OLS. (82)

2-3/1998: Wau — After ejecting Kerubino's forces, the Sudan army and its militias "turned on Dinka residents and butchered hundreds of them. More than 150 students of Wau University were rounded up and marched away, never to be heard of again." Consequently, "about 80,000 of the town's residents fled to the surrounding countryside," creating an immediate food crisis. (83)

2-3/1998: Nyamlell, Adhal, Marial Bol, Wungueng, Pantiit, Aluelachot, Ayakhong, Warawar, Pandit, etc — In the aftermath of the fight for Wau, a 2,500-strong Sudan government/Murahileen force guarding a Sudan government train proceeding to Wau raids fifteen villages in Aweil East and West counties. More than fifty civilians are killed, scores are enslaved, thousands of cattle are looted, and thousands of huts (tukuls) destroyed. (84)

3/1998: Pakor — Thousands from Gogrial and Twic counties walk for days to reach Pakor, and though UN/WFP provides for nearly 45,000 beneficiaries its program is overwhelmed. (85) CSI reports that "many people are dying of starvation." (86) MSF finds that 18 percent of children under five suffer from severe malnutrition. (87) MSF registered 808 starving children in eight feeding centers in late March; "by May 31, the number of children had increased to 5,037." (88)

3/1998: Adet — The UN/WFP began airdrops to thousands of starving displaced who had congregated at Adet, near Wau.

3/1998: Wau — Once government military forced Kerubino's forces from Wau, the government army and its militias "turned on Dinka residents and butchered hundreds of them. More than 150 students of Wau University were rounded up and marched away, never to be heard of again." Consequently, "about 80,000 of the town's residents fled to the surrounding countryside," creating an immediate food crisis. "The Nairobi-based UN Regional Information Network states people have resorted to sifting the earth in the hope of finding grains of wild rice." Seed was scarce, fishing was poor, and water levels in rivers and pools were "low due to drought." Many Dinka were forced to slaughter their animals for food. (89)

3/1998: Rumbek — Rumbek county, which suffered an extensive drought in 1997, has almost no food. The town is emptied, and thousands of starving in search of food and water congregate at Cuibet, Pakor, Mapel, and Akot.

3-5/1998: Ajiep, Leer — During the week of March 22, MSF reports "a total of 808 children were registered in six centers in Bahr el Ghazal." By May 31, the total number of
children will increase to 5,037. In Leer town, western Bahr al-Ghazal, 259 children were admitted in the first days of the feeding center, 128 of whom were severely malnourished. (90) Scores die.

4/1998:  
Kowach — Hundreds of starving people arrive from the north. Kowach region was attacked by SSDF in 1987 and finished off by Murahileen cattle rustlers in April 1998.

4/1998:  
Akumkum, Panthou, Thietkou — As the "hunger gap" period (July-August) approaches, the situation approaches a danger point. Very high levels of malnutrition are reported at Akumkum (Tonj county), Panthou (Gogrial county), and Thietkou. Chronic malnutrition is reported in children under five at Panthou. Severe diarrhoea is reported in more than 60 percent of the under-five population at Acumcum. The SRRA reports a "looming human tragedy in Bahr al-Ghazal." (91)

4/1998:  
Turalei — GOAL assessment indicates severe malnutrition, and nearly 1,000 children were found to be "very vulnerable."

5/1998:  
Abin Dau — In a "terrible scene of devastation," the village in Twic County is purposely destroyed. Following a militia attack, hundreds of women and children are marched north to Abyei, South Kordofan. Hundreds were reported killed along the way. (92)

5/1998:  
Aweng — Nearly every village between Turalei and Aweng is destroyed, with deaths counted in the hundreds. Every young and adult male is targeted and if caught, killed. Perhaps as many as 10,000 people flee to the swamps where they survive on water lily tubers, grass, and fish. (93)

5-6/1998:  
Warawar — In June, a significant SPLA victory at Warawar forces the Rizayqat and Missiriya Murahileen from northern Bahr al-Ghazal after nearly six months of raiding. In "various raids made between May 4 and 14, and again in early June, the Arab militias destroyed entire villages and exacerbated the famine situation in northern Bahr al-Ghazal." "The Dinka populations of Aweil West and northeastern Gogrial were either destroyed or totally displaced in the initial attacks. Women and children were captured and taken into slavery; hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle were looted." With the SPLA counterattack, the Arab militias failed "to take control of the land between the rivers Kiir and Lol." (94)

5/1998:  
Rumbek — Two years of poor harvest and sharing food had left Rumbek devastated. At Rumbek and Agangrial, Oxfam found some children "acutely malnourished." The famine in southern Sudan was deepening, and in the northern Bahr: "The people have no reserves, no food stocks at all," and there was no hope for even a minimal 1998 harvest. (95) By June, a migration of needy toward Yambio in Equatoria was noted, and 2,000 Dinka arrived at Tambura.

5/1998:  
Twic County — "Waves of militia raids" forced hundreds from their homes "at the critical moment for planting." (96)

6-7/1998:  
Wau — In the May-June period, about 60,000 desperate people arrived in search of food. In late June, Wau received "about 2,000 a day," and Wau residents who returned were soon destitute because "their property had been looted by government forces." That Dinka returned to garrison towns illustrated just "how bad the famine is, because those who fled... believed that there were reprisal massacres of Dinka who stayed behind; the estimates range from 200 to 2,000 victims." (97) An airlift to Wau city begins on May 30, and 150 tons a week are delivered to feed 15,000 needed. In July, displaced people poured into Wau "at the rate of 2,500 a day." At Wau, UNICEF chief Carol Bellamy noted that conditions had worsened: "Most shocking of all were the rows of freshly-dug graves," including the "graves of 51 people who had died hours earlier." (98) In mid-July, there were 70-80 deaths a day in Wau. (99)
6/1998: Ayien, Turalei, Mapel — Khartoum forces attacked "the predominantly Christian population of Twic County... between the 1st and 10th of June." The troops attacked Turalei village and "destroyed the destitute community's only supply of medicines." Four days later, they raided Mapel village, "where approximately 30,000 famine victims had gathered." Many were killed or captured.(100)

6/1998: Malou Pec — Scattered dead are noted near a feeding station and in the bush. Regionally, "perhaps 700,000 people [are] on the brink of starvation." The Dinka cattle are being slaughtered and sold at "hunger markets."(101)

D-7 • Bahr al-Ghazal: Desperate Race To Reduce Famine Losses

In May 1998, the OLS Coordinator indicated that conditions "had reached a critical and frightening level."(102) Events were unfolding rapidly, and MSF reported that "death, disease, and acute food shortages are stalking hundreds of thousands of severely malnourished children in southern Sudan's Ajiep, Bahr el Ghazal region." "Over half" of the children attending MSF feeding centers were not improving "because the distribution of food to the general population is inadequate."

WFP immediately scrambled to increase food in the "pipeline" (the Khartoum government donated no food, and UN/WFP purchased 4,300 tons of cereal "in northern Sudan."

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) issued a press release indicating: "In the troubled region of Bahr al-Ghazal alone, an estimated 380,000 people are suffering from severe hunger" [emphasis added]. The UN/WFP reported that it would "add 300,000 people" to its feeding operation, and from supply points at Kenya, Uganda, and El-Obeid (opened in June), the race began to move food to Bahr al-Ghazal. In June, the OLS program raised its target population from 595,000 to 700,000 desperately needy.(104)

By July, there were 13 UN/WFP feeding centers operating in Bahr al-Ghazal, each needing 700 tons of food a month. To avert massive famine, the international community was urged to fund 20 feeding centers.(105) Relief workers on the ground reported privately that deaths in the region could already be counted in the tens of thousands.

In July, the Khartoum government agreed to a one month cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal and parts of Upper Nile region, although the SPLA had asked for a hiatus of three months.(106) The government then agreed to three months and agreed to move "two trains every month" from Babanusa in northern Sudan to Wau—something that had not happened in 15 years.(107)

7/1998: Panacier — Sudan Air Force bombardment just misses a World Vision feeding center where 1,000 malnourished children are receiving assistance.(108)

7/1998: Ajeip — Located 20 miles north of Wau, it is perhaps the village hardest hit by famine in SPLA territory. Severely malnourished children (weighing less than 60 percent of normal for their height) are commonplace. At a crowded graveyard, 33 were buried in early July.(109) Days later, MSF reported that among the 6,000 encamped near feeding stations some 20 children were dying every week and eight adults died every day. Initial reports indicated that 18 people out of every 10,000 were dying each day, and as the famine progressed, the rate was "close to 70 per
Among infants under the age of five, "the rate went up from just under 32 deaths per 10,000 to 133 per 10,000."(110)

7/1998: Yirol — LWR reports "serious food deficit due to war and drought."(111) There is only one for 340,000 people.

7/1998: Mayath — Forty starvation deaths are reported in four weeks. (112) "Observers fear that if the Dinka cope with the short-term situation by slaughtering most cattle this year, the famine could be worse next year—and the number of deaths could rise."

7/1998: Panthou — "Lured by the promise of food, thousands of starving people have been pouring into Panthou from other parts of Aweil and Gogrial counties." Many were driven to flee by Murahileen who had "been raiding Dinka villages along a nearby railway since April."(113) A visitor finds "more than 100 newly dug graves with rude wooden markers."

7/1998: Mapel, Rumbek — MSF has been able to reduce the deaths of children under five to three a week at Mapel. In contrast, Dinka families are allowing the weakest family members to die. Recent arrivals are "too weak to smile, or even to cry, and young and old are ravaged by diarrhea and tuberculosis."(114) OLS airdrops 110-pound sacks of grain which "are carried into town by the fittest member of each family."

7-8/1998: Wau — In July, a second cargo plane begins to airlift supplies to Wau. 300 tons of food are delivered a week. Despite government claims that three to four flights a day reached Wau from Khartoum, very little food arrived at displaced persons camps. In July alone, from "20 and 50 people [were] perishing every day." From August 1-28, "1,330 people have died in and around Wau town."(115) In August, malnutrition rates in Wau city were "skyrocketing" at ICRC feeding centers.

8/1998: Ajeip — Since July, MSF reports that within a radius of three miles: "Every day 120 people are dying in a total population of 17,500." The UN/WFP airdropped 290 tons of food between July 14 and 23, "enough to feed 33,000 people for a month." However, a grand total of 70,000 people located in and around the town were starving.(116)

8/1998: Aweil, Abyei, Meiram — At Aweil, some 9,000 displaced urgently need food aid. The town has been isolated since February, and the UN/WFP asserts that "insecurity in and around the town had blocked WFP from air-dropping food this year." In a replication of 1988 famine conditions, 15,000 Dinka flee to Abyei and Meiram, West Kordofan, where food feeding centers are operated through the UN/WFP.(117) "Floods" of displaced made their way through Aweil to Abyei, and then by bus or truck to Khartoum, where more that a million displaced persons were already overcrowded in the four great camps located there. Some 18,000 displaced arrived at Khartoum in May and June, most of them "in a very bad state."(118)

In September, the Nile floods caused substantial displacement to an already affected Bahr al-Ghazal region.

09/1998: Rumbek. Reports indicate that serious flooding has caused tens of thousands to make their way to Rumbek, where 100,000 displaced are soon reported.(119)
Footnotes for Section IV, Part D, "Genocide in Bahr al-Ghazal"


(45) Ibid., November 1996;


(64) "Sudanese at Risk Following Ban on Relief Flights," IPS, Nairobi, February 18, 1998; Central and Eastern Africa: UN-IRIN Update 353, February 12, 1998.

"MSF warns of looming famine disaster in southern Sudan," AFP, Nairobi, June 8, 1998.


