
Country Conditions: Ukraine February 2026
On February 24, 2026, Ukraine enters its fifth year of war after a full-scale Russian invasion of the country began...
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By: Rachel Ryu, Policy Analyst at USCRI
This “Behind the Brief” accompanies Policy & Advocacy’s Brief from Volume 9, Issue No. 3, “The Danger of Globally Institutionalizing Third Country Returns,” originally published on November 19, 2025. You can find the complete brief at the end.
Reason Behind the Brief
Return hubs and third country returns are two migration control measures that have gained appeal with policymakers in the United States, Europe, and Australia. These measures are being used to transfer noncitizens outside of national borders. Third country deportations are different from migration externalization measures that have been widely used for many years but which became particularly pervasive at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Here’s how return hubs and third country returns compare to externalization measures:
Safe Third Country Agreements
Country A can deem an individual ineligible for asylum and remove them to Country B, which is deemed safe, if the individual is deemed to have a connection or have passed through Country B before reaching Country A.
Example: U.S.-Canada (but see legal controversies on this agreement)
Metering
Country A limits the number of asylum seekers processed at ports of entry, forcing asylum seekers to turn back to contiguous Country B to wait for an opportunity to seek admission into Country A. Asylum seekers may have been turned back before or after arriving in Country A.
Example: U.S.-Mexico border (2016-2020)
Offshoring
An asylum seeker arrives in and applies for asylum in Country A. Country A transfers them to Country B, forcing the asylum seeker to wait there while Country A processes their asylum application.
Examples: U.S. Title 42 Expulsions (2020-2023), Australia-Nauru (2001-2023), UK-Rwanda (agreement formalized in 2022, scrapped in 2024 before individuals were deported), Italy-Albania (2023-present)
Return Hubs
Country A issues a final order of removal to a noncitizen who has exhausted their asylum application and appeals but who cannot be deported to their country of origin, for reasons of ongoing conflict, risk of torture or cruel or inhumane treatment, or rejection by the country of origin to accept the individual. Country A seeks a diplomatic agreement with Country B. Country A may pay for housing, legal, food, medical, and administrative fees in exchange for Country B accepting noncitizens.
Proposed by: The EU, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands
Third Country Deportations
Country A enters into a diplomatic agreement with Country B to accept third country noncitizens who are deported from Country A. Country A deports noncitizens with humanitarian-based protections who cannot be removed to their country origin, noncitizens who have criminal convictions, and noncitizens who are not under a period of authorized stay to Country B, without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to challenge the removal. Upon landing in Country B, third country noncitizens are under the jurisdiction of Country B and may be removed to their country of origin, where they may face persecution or torture.
Used by the United States.
While seemingly similar to return hubs, third country deportations are less formal and executed via separate agreements with each country. Key differences from the EU return hub proposals and the U.S. practice include deporting people without adequate notice of a final order of removal and providing lump-sum payments to countries for their cooperation, rather than funding temporary housing and other services to the deported individual.
In the past half decade, there has been a concerted effort by Global North countries to institutionalize third country removals. Many of the proposals and bilateral agreements detailed in the P&A Brief have been accompanied by domestic legislative changes. These legislative changes are resulting in the codification of the erosion of human rights for migrants and asylum seekers into national laws.
International Human Rights Frameworks
Return hubs and third country deportations are a human rights concern because a crucial question is not being asked: “If deported to Country B (a third country), does the individual face a risk of persecution or torture?” To follow international refugee law, this question must be asked and answered on an individual basis and requires case-by-case review.
A key instrument outlining international refugee law is the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”). The United States participated in the drafting of the Refugee Convention and acceded to the 1967 Protocol, which incorporated the 1951 Convention. The Refugee Act of 1980 codified the United States’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, establishing a legal framework for refugee admissions and asylum protections.
The Refugee Convention requires countries to:
The Refugee Convention prohibits a country from deporting a refugee to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Countries cannot suspend or opt out of this obligation (Art. 33). Also prohibited is deporting a refugee lawfully present on grounds of national security or public order. Expulsions should be done in accordance with due process of law, where the refugee has an opportunity to submit evidence and appeal. (Art. 32)
Rights and protections outlined in the Refugee Convention are rooted in fundamental human rights. Fundamental human rights are universal and non-derogable, meaning that every human being must be able to enjoy them. Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all human beings, including noncitizens, must be afforded:
Other human rights treaties also codify and further specify rights that must be afforded to all persons, including noncitizens.
Narrowing the Right to Remain
Despite the international legal framework, countries are limiting these rights by ignoring them on an individual basis and haphazardly condemning wide groups, particularly noncitizens who have criminal convictions. In order to uphold the principle of non-refoulement, countries have a duty to ensure that each individual gets a case-by-case review, a chance to appeal, and a chance to exhaust other options. Countries like the United States and the UK are seeking to narrow these rights.
In August 2025, the UK increased a list of countries they deemed “safe” to 23 countries. That means nationals of those countries can be deported under the “Deport Now Appeal Later” scheme. Under the scheme, nationals of “safe countries” who have been convicted of a crime in the UK can be deported to those countries before they can appeal their humanitarian-based immigration decisions in a UK court. If individuals decide to appeal, they are allowed to do so only from overseas, via video conference.
The U.S. third country deportation scheme has repeatedly deported noncitizens who have criminal convictions without due process, putting them at risk of being returned to countries where they could face harm. Such policies perpetuate a belief that people convicted of crimes are not only undeserving of international refugee protection but manipulating the system. There are also examples of individuals without criminal convictions being deported to third countries. Recent political rhetoric has unfairly cast criminal suspicion on entire immigrant populations due to individual alleged acts. Public safety and immigration are often separate and unrelated domestic issues, but politicians too often conflate the two to enflame fear and xenophobia.
As advocates, we will continue to track third country deportation schemes and human rights abuses wherever they are. Follow along with us by viewing our third country deportations tracker here. Stay tuned for further updates on third country deportations.
See the full brief from Volume 9, Issue No. 3 below.
Third country deportations should not be used as a tool for immigration enforcement. Often used as a tool to manage a politicized migration “problem,” third country deportations have the potential to normalize rights-free zones, forced exile, and indefinite detention. In February 2025, DHS issued a policy directive on third country deportations. The policy proposes forcibly deporting noncitizens, even those with humanitarian relief, to a third country instead of a country that is their country of nationality or where they last resided. Third country deportations immediately sparked legal challenges over safety, due process, and human rights concerns.
The United States is not the first country to propose or conduct third country deportations, despite the serious human rights concerns they raise. The United Kingdom, the European Union, and Australia have all proposed third country return schemes as a tool for migration control, immigration enforcement, and domestic approval.
Orderly migration can and must include plans for safe and voluntary returns. UNHCR has recommended that better systems are needed to ensure that people who are not in need of refugee protection retain meaningful agency in their decision-making. Options such as voluntary repatriation, access to other lawful migration pathways, or the ability to legally move to another country are all rights-respecting approaches that can be reflected in domestic policy.
Policymakers should take pause and question if current policies proposed and in use around the world are indeed the best approach. As new policies are pursued by governments who are failing to prioritize dignity and compassion in an effort to respond to global failures, it will be more important than ever for organizations like USCRI and others to monitor these efforts.
UK – Third Country Offshoring
In April 2022, the UK Government under Conservative leadership announced the UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership. Under the agreement, the UK would send people seeking asylum to Rwanda to have their asylum claims processed. Rwanda built facilities that were fenced in, and it’s unclear whether asylum seekers would have had freedom of movement or opportunities to work. If asylum was granted, asylees could reenter the UK. If asylum was denied, individuals would be offered a chance to apply for asylum in Rwanda. Several countries have employed push-back strategies to offshore asylum, but the UK-Rwanda agreement was one of the first to propose sending asylum seekers who had entered UK soil to a third country on another continent to process their asylum cases.
In its justifications, the UK Government used divisive, politicized talking points—that people should not be rewarded for paying smugglers or for using “illegal routes” to seek asylum. In exchange for accepting asylum seekers, Rwanda was poised to receive ₤370 million in addition to further payments for each individual they received.
Human rights advocates and international human rights organizations called the deal an erosion of refugee rights, and the UK Supreme Court ruled it unlawful because of the risk of refoulement. In July 2024, the newly elected Labour Government announced that it would scrap the UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership.
EU Return Hubs
In October 2024, the European Council (EC) proposed a “Common European System for Returns,” which will come into effect mid-2026. Any noncitizen who fails to voluntary leave the EU after exhausting their asylum application and appeals can be forcibly transferred to a third country “return hub.” The use of return hubs is also in the UK’s returns policy plan, and the government has stated that it is in discussions with a number of possible reception countries.
According to the EC, return hub agreements “can only be concluded with a third country where international human rights standards and principles in accordance with international law.” However, the EC’s proposal includes barebones safeguards, such as a monitoring mechanism and the disqualification of unaccompanied children and families with children. Despite the lack of detail, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR support the proposal, citing the need for effective return systems.
Staging returns outside of EU territory creates the risk for rights-free zones, similar to how the U.S. Government has used Guantánamo Bay. The EC’s plan includes a monitoring mechanism, but it does not detail how human rights abuses will be redressed. There are no guidelines for how return hub facilities are designed and whether they will be adequate for vulnerable groups, respect freedom of movement, or allow for the pursuit of livelihoods and education.
The EC’s proposal is endorsed by IOM and UNHCR because third country returns are limited to noncitizens who are on notice that they are legally required to leave the EU. Other countries—like Italy and the United States—are proposing much harsher third country return schemes.
Italy – A Mixed-Use Facility
In 2023, Italy’s conservative government entered into an agreement with Albania to build offshore migrant detention centers. Italy’s conservative government initially planned to detain and fast-track asylum cases at the detention center, but that plan was initially blocked by Italian judges in October 2024. The main concern at issue is that the efforts to fast-track asylum claims impermissibly increase the risk of unsafe returns. In order to avoid legal challenges, Italy announced that it would use the detention center as a “return hub,” consistent with the EC’s proposal. However, on November 13, the Italian Prime Minister stated that her government is “determined to push ahead” with the original plan to detain asylum seekers and fast-track their cases.
The Italy-Albania facilities have already become a threat to human life and human rights abuses. In April 2025, even during the limited use of the Albanian detention center, 10 suicide attempts were reported. Although Italy said that only male adults will be detained in Albania, the detention center is outfitted with playgrounds and breastfeeding areas, questioning whether the Italian government eventually plans to send children, pregnant women, and other vulnerable groups.
Untested, Costly, and Dangerous
The risk of human rights abuses should be enough to deter such policies from even being considered. In addition, policymakers should be concerned about wasteful governmental spending. The UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership would have cost UK taxpayers ₤1.8 million ($2.3 million) for every asylum seeker sent to Rwanda. And until the plan was abandoned, the UK paid Rwanda ₤290 million ($381 million), which Rwanda is refusing to pay back.
The Italian detention center in Albania cost €800 million ($930 million), construction went over schedule, and the first asylum seekers sent there were immediately transferred back to Italy due to legal challenges. Governments are using public resources to broker controversial agreements and legally defend questionable practices. Despite claiming to act in the public interest, many agreements and official determinations are not publicly available.
Fundamental human rights, individual lives, and diplomatic relationships are at stake. Moreover, it is unclear whether “return hubs” will motivate people to return to their countries of nationality. The plan fails to address the fate of stateless persons, as well as people who had to flee their homes as children who have no familiarity with their countries of nationality. Third country deportations simply shift the burden of processing returns to a third country. Moreover, many of these schemes make indefinite detention possible.
Countries should not use return hubs or any third-country agreement as a way around international human rights commitments. Migrants are human beings, not pawns to move around on the world map. Rather than turning to untested, costly, and dangerous proposals to enforce immigration laws, countries can reinvest in durable solutions, equitable responsibility-sharing, and human rights institutions. Finally, continued attention is needed to show how rights-respecting policy models can be developed and why they provide states with a more durable, effective framework.
USCRI, founded in 1911, is a non-governmental, not-for-profit international organization committed to working on behalf of refugees and immigrants and their transition to a dignified life.
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